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The Strength of Statistical Evidence for
Composite Hypotheses: Inference to the Best
Explanation
David R. Bickel
Abstract
A general function to quantify the weight of evidence in a sample of data for
one hypothesis over another is derived from the law of likelihood and from a sta-
tistical formalization of inference to the best explanation. For a fixed parameter
of interest, the resulting weight of evidence that favors one composite hypothesis
over another is the likelihood ratio using the parameter value consistent with each
hypothesis that maximizes the likelihood function over the parameter of interest.
Since the weight of evidence is generally only known up to a nuisance parameter,
it is approximated by replacing the likelihood function with a reduced likelihood
function on the interest parameter space. Unlike the Bayes factor and unlike the
p-value under interpretations that extend its scope, the weight of evidence is co-
herent in the sense that it cannot support a hypothesis over any hypothesis that it
entails. Further, when comparing the hypothesis that the parameter lies outside a
non-trivial interval to the hypothesis that it lies within the interval, the proposed
method of weighing evidence almost always asymptotically favors the correct hy-
pothesis under mild regularity conditions. Even at small sample sizes, replacing a
simple hypothesis with an interval hypothesis substantially reduces the probabil-
ity of observing misleading evidence. Sensitivity of the weight of evidence to hy-
potheses’ specification is mitigated by making them imprecise. The methodology
is illustrated in the multiple comparisons setting of gene expression microarray
data, and issues with simultaneous inference and multiplicity are addressed.
Version note
This revision of Bickel (2008) was last modiﬁed in content on 10 June 2010 and
was uploaded to COBRA on 13 September 2010.
1 Introduction
1.1 Decision-theoretic inference and evidential inference
Current needs to evaluate evidence over thousands of hypotheses in genomics
and data mining reopen the question of how to quantify the strength of evidence.
Some of the most pronounced diﬀerences between inferences made by methods
based on coverage or error frequencies and by other statistical methods occur
in the realm of multiple comparisons, giving new importance to old debates on
the foundations of statistics.
Each of the two main frameworks of statistical inference rests on solid
decision-theoretic foundations. In the most-developed frequentist framework,
that of Neyman and Pearson, the practice of deciding to reject only those hy-
potheses with valid p-values falling below a ﬁxed signiﬁcance level strictly con-
trols the rate of Type I errors. In the most-developed Bayesian framework,
that of F. P. Ramsey (cited in Jeﬀreys (1948)), de Finetti (1970), and Savage
(1954), the concept of coherent decision-making leads to probability as a mea-
sure of belief in the sense that it increases monotonically with how much the
rational decision-maker would wager on its truth given the available information
and a ﬁxed loss function, prior distribution, and model. The methods of both
frameworks ﬁnd direct applications to problems requiring some degree of auto-
matic decision-making. For example, the Neyman-Pearson framework provides
rules deciding when a clinical trial is successful or when to stop an unsuccessful
trial, and the Bayes-Ramsey framework enables e-mail ﬁlters to decide which
messages are unwanted.
The methods of these decision-theoretic frameworks have been adapted to
problems requiring reports of the strength of the evidence in the data supporting
one hypothesis over another rather than automated decisions to reject one hy-
pothesis in favor of another. Bayes factors have long been advocated as measures
of the strength of statistical evidence (e.g., Jeﬀreys (1948); Kass and Raftery
(1995)). Accordingly, Osteyee and Good (1974) considered the logarithm of the
Bayes factor the weight of evidence for one hypothesis over another. This
seems reasonable since the Bayes factor is equal to the posterior odds divided
by the prior odds. (Weight of evidence is instead used herein as an abbreviation
for strength of statistical evidence.)
Likewise, p-values from methods designed to control the rate of Type I (false
positive) errors are routinely interpreted in the scientiﬁc literature as measures
of evidence favoring alternative hypotheses over null hypotheses. Although the
comparison of a p-value to a previously ﬁxed level of signiﬁcance to make a deci-
sion on rejecting a null hypothesis is common in clinical trials, in less regulated
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ﬁelds, the p-value is more often interpreted as a measure of evidence or support
that a sample of data provides about a statistical hypothesis. Wright (1992)
put it simply, "The smaller the p-value, the stronger the evidence against the
null hypothesis." This use by Fisher of the p-value to quantify the degree of
consistency of the data with the null hypothesis is called signiﬁcance testing to
sharply distinguish it from its use by Neyman to decide whether to reject the
null hypothesis at a previously ﬁxed Type I error rate (Cox, 1977). Among the
examples of signiﬁcance testing to be found in scientiﬁc disciplines as diverse
as biomedicine, basic neuroscience, and physics may be found the common but
theoretically unjustiﬁed practice of taking a suﬃciently high p-value as evidence
that there is "no eﬀect" (Spicer and Francisco, 1997; Pasterkamp et al., 2003)
and many statisticians' interpretation of a suﬃciently low p-value as strong ev-
idence against the null hypothesis; e.g., Fraser et al. (2004). Even the critics
of signiﬁcance testing acknowledge that it serves its purpose in some situations
(Spjøtvoll, 1977; Goodman and Royall, 1988).
1.1.1 Coherence and objectivity
In spite of the uncontested value of methods of the Neyman-Pearson and Bayes-
Ramsey frameworks in the decision-making roles for which they are optimal,
their application to quantifying the strength of statistical evidence remains con-
troversial. For neither the p-value nor the Bayes factor qualiﬁes as a general
measure of evidence if the strength of statistical evidence in a particular data
set for one given hypothesis over another under a speciﬁed family of probability
distributions must meet both of these criteria:
 the coherence condition, that strength of evidence is always consistent
with the rules of logic;
 the objectivity condition, that the strength of evidence does not vary from
one researcher to another.
Schervish (1996) and Lavine and Schervish (1999) point out that a candidate
measure of the strength of evidence is illogical or incoherent if it can assign more
support to a hypothesis than to a hypothesis it implies; candidates that cannot
do so are considered coherent. For example, an incoherent candidate might say
an observation of parents' eye colors supports the hypothesis that their child
will have brown eyes over the hypothesis that she will have either blue eyes or
brown eyes.
Schervish (1996) and Royall (1997) criticized the p-value as a measure of
support by comparing one-sided and two-sided p-values under the same family
of sampling distributions. For a scalar parameter θ, say the null hypothesis θ = 0
is tested with θ 6= 0 and θ > 0 as the alternative hypotheses. If the p-value of
the two-sided test is twice that of the one-sided test, then signiﬁcance testing
would attach more evidence to the hypothesis that θ > 0 than to the hypothesis
that θ 6= 0 relative to the same null hypothesis even though θ > 0 ⇒ θ 6= 0. If
the signiﬁcance level lies between the two p-values, then θ > 0 but not θ 6= 0
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would be accepted over the null hypothesis. However, this source of incoherence
only arrises if one-sided p-values are used with unbounded parameters; many
researchers as a matter of principle only use them with bounded parameters,
e.g., θ ≥ 0, in eﬀect ruling out consideration of one-sided composite hypotheses
about an unbounded parameter value.
A related instance of incoherence stems from interpreting one-sided p-values
as attained conﬁdence levels of composite hypotheses, including those concern-
ing the value of an unbounded parameter. Since such attained conﬁdence levels
can be smaller for a region than for a region it contains (Efron and Tibshirani,
1998; Polansky, 2007, pp. 224-227), they are not coherent measures of evidence.
Lavine and Schervish (1999) likewise argued that the Bayes factor is incoher-
ent as a measure of evidence. Consider the observation x of a discrete random
n-tuple X. Based on the family {fθ} of probability mass functions and the
conditional prior measures pi1 and pi2 given hypotheses θ = 0 and −1 < θ < 1,
respectively, the Bayes factor∫
fθ (x) dpi1 (θ)∫ 1
−1 fθ (x) dpi2 (θ)
=
f0 (x)∫ 1
−1 fθ (x) dpi2 (θ)
will be greater than 1 if the maximum likelihood estimate is suﬃciently close
to 0 and if the prior density of θ is nonzero for all θ ∈ (−1, 1). In this case, the
logarithm of the Bayes factor as the weight of evidence would attribute more
support to θ = 0 than to −1 < θ < 1, and yet θ = 0⇒ −1 < θ < 1.
In spite of its potential incoherence when used alone, the Bayes factor may
instead be used to compute a ratio of posterior probabilities of the hypotheses
in question, and such a ratio would satisfy the coherence condition (Lavine and
Schervish, 1999). In the strict Bayes-Ramsey framework, however, since the
prior probability of each hypothesis varies from one decision maker to another,
the ratio of posterior probabilities violates the objectivity condition of a mea-
sure of evidence. In the applied data analysis, Bayesians rarely make the eﬀort
required to elicit prior distributions from experts to adequately reﬂect their lev-
els of uncertainty about parameter values, perhaps because it is justiﬁable in
very few practical situations. The arguably less subjective practice of automat-
ically assigning 50% prior probability to each hypothesis sacriﬁces coherence
by reducing the ratio of posterior probabilities to the Bayes factor. Although
the principle of insuﬃcient reason behind that practice still has its defenders
(?), the well known problems with partitioning the parameter set into equally
probable subsets remain (Kass and Wasserman, 1996). The Bayes factor also
requires a prior distribution if either hypothesis corresponds to more than one
parameter value or if there is a nuisance parameter. Although default priors are
much more convenient than their frankly subjective counterparts and seem to
oﬀer more objectivity (Berger, 2004), there is no consensus on how to select one
of the many available rules for generating default priors, and yet small-sample
inference can be sensitive to such selection (Kass and Wasserman, 1996). Ar-
guments for priors based on group invariance are compelling but do not apply
to all situations, whereas generally applicable and widely used reference pri-
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ors are functions of which parameters are of interest (Bernardo, 1979), thereby
eroding Bayes-Ramsey foundations unless the prior levels of an agent's beliefs
should depend on which parameter that agent intends to use in decision mak-
ing. Regardless of the speciﬁc algorithm selected, the automatic generation of
priors introduces a problem of interpreting the resulting posterior probabilities
since the prior probabilities do not correspond to any scientist's actual levels of
belief, as a more rigorous application of Bayes-Ramsey decision theory would
require. Consequently, a default prior often serves to determine what an ideal
agent whose beliefs were encoded by that prior would believe upon observing
the data (Bernardo, 1997). If a prior is instead chosen in order to derive credible
sets that match conﬁdence intervals, using Bayesian calculations for Neyman-
Pearson inference, objectivity and an unambiguous interpretation of probability
are thereby purchased at the price of abandoning strict Bayes-Ramsey decision
theory, except in special cases.
By contrast, the likelihood ratio satisﬁes both of the necessary conditions
for a measure of the strength of statistical evidence; it is coherent in the above
sense (Lavine and Schervish, 1999) without depending on the choice of a prior
distribution. In a philosophical study of the foundations of statistical theory,
I. Hacking proposed the law of likelihood in terms of data d and hypotheses h
and i: d supports h better than i whenever the likelihood ratio of h to i given
d exceeds 1 (Hacking, 1965, p. 71). The law is usually restated as follows. At
each value of θ, the D-dimensional parameter, f (•; θ) denotes the probability
density or probability mass function of the random n-tuple X of which the ﬁxed
n-tuple of observations x is a realization. L (•) = L (•;x) = f (•; θ) , a function
on the parameter space Θ, is called the likelihood function. In the evidential
framework of statistical inference, the likelihood ratio L (θ′;x) /L (θ′′;x) is the
strength of statistical evidence in X = x that supports θ = θ′ over θ = θ′′, and if
L (θ′;x) /L (θ′′;x) > 1, there is more evidence for θ = θ′ than for θ = θ′′ (Royall,
2000a). Both hypotheses under consideration are simple in the sense that each
corresponds to a single parameter value, a point in Θ. In this case of two simple
hypotheses, the logarithm of the Bayes factor equals log (L (θ′;x) /L (θ′′;x)),
which Edwards (1992) called the support for θ = θ′ over θ = θ′′.
1.1.2 Probability of misleading evidence
With the likelihood ratio as the measure of the strength of evidence, the ana-
log of a Type I error rate plays key roles in sample size planning and in the
choice of a method of eliminating nuisance parameters without itself quantify-
ing the strength of evidence (Strug et al., 2007; Blume, 2008). This analog,
the probability of observing misleading evidence, is deﬁned as follows. Consider
the strength of evidence in observed data generated by distribution Pθ in favor
of the false hypothesis that the data were generated by a distribution in the
set {Pθ′ : θ′ 6= θ}. The observation of misleading evidence is the event that the
strength of evidence for the false hypothesis exceeds a ﬁxed threshold represent-
ing the boundary between weaker and stronger evidence, and the probability of
observing misleading evidence is the limiting relative frequency of observations
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of misleading evidence under repeated sampling.
Ideally, the probability of observing misleading evidence would converge to
0 with increasing sample size. In other words, more information would increase
the reliability of inferences made from the available evidence, at least asymptot-
ically. Hypothesis testing at a ﬁxed Type I error rate fails in this regard since
measuring the strength of evidence by the p-value results in the same proba-
bility of observing misleading evidence for all samples sizes. Consequently, the
result of a conventional hypothesis test, whether expressed as a p-value or as
an accept/reject decision, cannot be evidentially interpreted without taking the
sample size into consideration, which is why a given p-value is thought to pro-
vide stronger evidence against the null hypothesis if the sample is small than if
it is large (Royall, 1997). For example, as Goodman and Royall (1988) explain,
a p-value of 0.05 in many cases corresponds to a likelihood ratio indicating over-
whelming evidence in favor of the null hypothesis for suﬃciently large samples.
For this reason, a measure of evidence is considered interpretable if the associ-
ated probability of observing misleading evidence approaches 0 asymptotically.
1.2 Evidence for a composite hypothesis
The classical law of likelihood is insuﬃcient for statistical inference if either
hypothesis is composite, that is, if it corresponds to multiple parameter values,
each an element of some Θ′ ⊆ Θ. This insuﬃciency threatens to severely limit
the scope of likelihood-evidential inference since most statistical tests in com-
mon use compare a simple null hypothesis θ = θ′′ to a composite alternative
hypothesis such as θ > θ′′ or θ 6= θ′′.
In some areas of application, subject-matter knowledge can inform the re-
placement of a composite hypothesis θ ∈ Θ′ with a simple hypothesis θ = θ′
in order to compute L (θ′) /L (θ′′) as the weight of evidence. For example, in
linkage analysis, Strug and Hodge (2006) set θ′ to the smallest plausible value
of the recombination fraction θ for the purpose of using likelihood ratios instead
of p-values that employ composite alternative hypotheses. In other domains,
any selection of a simple hypothesis in place of a composite hypothesis would
be unacceptably arbitrary or subjective. Nonetheless, there may sometimes
be advantages in evidential inference to setting θ′ to the parameter value as
close as possible to θ′′ such that |θ′ − θ′′| remains high enough to be practi-
cally signiﬁcant; this concept of scientiﬁc signiﬁcance was previously applied
to non-evidential gene expression data analyses (Bickel, 2004; Van De Wiel
and Kim, 2007). An alternative is to set θ′ to some conventional value, e.g.,
the value corresponding to a two-fold expression diﬀerence (an expression ratio
estimate of 1/2 or 2) remains a commonly used threshold with gene expres-
sion studies in spite of its arbitrary nature (Lewin et al., 2006). Comparing
the evidential strength of one simple hypothesis to another has the advantage
that Pθ′′ (L (θ
′) /L (θ′′) ≥ Λ), the probability of observing misleading evidence
at level Λ > 1, is asymptotically bounded by the standard normal cumulative
distribution function evaluated at −√2 log Λ if L is smooth and if the parameter
dimension D is ﬁxed, or by the Chebyshev or Markov bound 1/Λ more univer-
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sally (Royall, 2000a). In addition, limiting the parameter of interest to one of
two values is convenient when planning the size of a study (Strug et al., 2007).
Nonetheless, the weight of evidence involving a composite hypothesis cannot
in general be measured or even approximated by substituting a simple hypoth-
esis selected prior to observing the data. However, a solution to the compos-
ite hypothesis problem does appear to lie in the use of a likelihood interval
or more general likelihood set. The level-Λ likelihood set E (Λ) consists of all
values of θ satisfying L (θ) ≥ L
(
θ̂
)
/Λ, where θ̂ is the maximum likelihood
estimate. Membership in a likelihood set determines which parameter values
are considered obviously open to grave suspicion (Fisher, 1973, pp. 75-76) if
not inconsistent with the data (Barnard, 1967; Hoch and Blume, 2008). Thus,
whenever L
(
θ̂
)
/L (θ′′) > Λ and θ̂ 6= θ′′, one or more parameter values in
E (Λ) are considered better supported than θ = θ′′ by the data, and, for that
reason, L
(
θ̂
)
/L (θ′′) measures the weight of evidence for the composite hy-
potheses θ ∈ E (Λ) over the simple hypothesis θ = θ′′. By the same reasoning,
L
(
θ̂
)
/L (θ′′) measures the weight of evidence for the composite hypotheses
θ 6= θ′′ over the simple hypothesis θ = θ′′.
More generally, a formal interpretation of the principle of inference to the
best explanation entails that W (Θ′,Θ′′) = supθ′∈Θ′ L (θ
′) / supθ′′∈Θ′′ L (θ
′′)
uniquely quantiﬁes the weight of evidence for the hypotheses that θ ∈ Θ′ over
the hypothesis that θ ∈ Θ′′ in the absence of prior hypothesis probabilities,
where Θ′ and Θ′′ are subsets of the parameter space (2). It follows that, if θ
is the parameter of interest, θ ∈ Θ′ is better supported than θ ∈ Θ′′ if and only
if supθ′∈Θ′ L (θ
′;x) > supθ′′∈Θ′′ L (θ
′′;x), a conclusion a preliminary version of
the present article (Bickel, 2008) and Zhang (2009b) independently derived from
diﬀerent axiomatic systems.
[Zhang (2009b) also recorded asymptotic properties of W (Θ′,Θ′′), applied it
to several interesting examples, refuted objections against its adoption, and gave
guidelines for its derivation from statistical reports in the absence of the origi-
nal data. The most important practical diﬀerence between our two approaches
emerges in the presence of a nuisance parameter. Zhang (2009b) follows Royall
(1992) and He et al. (2007) in framing the nuisance parameter problem as a spe-
cial case of the composite hypothesis problem, whereas Bickel (2008) maintains
the complete separation between the two problems (see Section 2.5). Unique
contributions of the present paper will be summarized in Section 6.1.]
A discrepancy between the performance of the likelihood ratio for two ﬁxed
simple hypotheses and the likelihood ratio maximized over a subset of parameter
space including parameter values arbitrarily close to that of a simple hypothesis
was uncovered by the example of the multivariate normal family with a 5-
dimensional mean as θ (Kalbﬂeisch, 2000). Asymptotically, for any ﬁxed θ′ and
θ′′ in Θ = R15, there is a 2.1% upper bound on Pθ′′ (L (θ′) /L (θ′′) > 8), the
probability of observing misleading evidence at level Λ = 8 (Royall, 2000a). By
contrast, the probability that the level-8 likelihood set contains θ′′, assuming
it is the true value of θ, is less than 50% (Kalbﬂeisch, 2000). This means the
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asymptotic probability of observing misleading evidence for θ ∈ R15\ {θ′′} over
θ = θ′′ exceeds the asymptotic probability of observing misleading evidence for
θ = θ′ over θ = θ′′ by a factor of 25 or more. This malady is not limited
to the normal case, but is symptomatic of inadequate interpretability when a
hypothesis representing practically the entire parameter space is pitted against
a simple hypothesis. The universal upper bound on Pθ′′ (L (θ
′) /L (θ′′) > 8) is
12.5%, the Chebyshev or Markov bound. That is more than a factor of 4 smaller
than Pθ′′
(
L
(
θ̂
)
/L (θ′′) > 8
)
= 52.7% in the example of D = 5 and conditions
under which 2 log
(
L
(
θ̂
)
/L (θ′′)
)
is asymptotically distributed as χ2 with D
degrees of freedom.
Given such an asymptotic distribution, L
(
θ̂
)
/L (θ′′) does not meet the in-
terpretability condition of Section 1.1 since
∀Λ>1 lim
n→∞Pθ
′′
(
L
(
θ̂
)
/L (θ′′) > Λ
)
= α
for some α > 0. Thus, L
(
θ̂
)
/L (θ′′) is no more interpretable than a p-value as
the strength of evidence.
Interpretability is recovered by instead quantifying the strength of evidence
for a composite hypothesis over an interval hypothesis, e.g., for |θ| > θ+ over
|θ| ≤ θ+ for some ﬁxed θ+ > 0. The proof is in Section 2. In addition to satisfy-
ing the interpretability condition, weighing evidence for composite hypotheses
has intrinsic scientiﬁc merit, as, for example, when assessing evidence for bioe-
quivalence or diﬀerential gene expression. Section 2 also highlights connections
between Hacking's law of likelihood, evidence sets, and evidence for or against
composite hypotheses.
For some applications, the main drawback of replacing a simple hypothesis
with an interval hypothesis is the dependence on the interval bounds. This is
largely overcome by the extension of evidential inference to handle imprecise
composite hypotheses in Section 3.
The proposed methodology is studied by simulation (4) and illustrated by
application to microarray gene expression data (5). Imprecise composite hy-
potheses provide a natural formalization of the imprecision inherent in what is
meant when a biologist says a gene is diﬀerentially expressed; this imprecision
applies to diﬀerential protein and metabolite expression as well as to diﬀeren-
tial gene expression. [Looking over thousands of genes for diﬀerential expression
poses an extreme multiple comparisons problem in the Neyman-Pearson frame-
work. Because, unlike the p-value, the likelihood ratio as a measure of statistical
evidence is not based on the control of a Type I error rate, it is not adjusted
for multiple comparisons by enforcing control of a family-wise error rate or a
false discovery rate (2.4). While many statisticians see the ability to correct
for multiple tests in this way as an important advantage of the p-value over
the likelihood ratio alone (Korn and Freidlin, 2006), others maintain that the
perceived need to correct for multiple comparisons exposes a shortcoming in the
evidential interpretation of the p-value (Royall, 1997).]
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Section 6 has a discussion and opportunities for further research.
2 Inference about precise hypotheses
2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 Basic notation
The symbols ⊂ and ⊆ designate proper subsets and (possibly improper) subsets,
respectively.
Consider the ﬁxed positive integer D and the parameter space Θ ⊆ R1D.
For all θ ∈ Θ, the probability distribution of the observable random n-tuple
X ∈ Ω ⊆ R1n admits a probability density or mass function f (•; θ) on Ω such
that θ′ 6= θ′′ ⇒ f (•; θ′) 6= f (•; θ′′). For X = x, the likelihood function on Θ is
L (•) = L (•;x) = f (x; •). Unless speciﬁed otherwise, the propositions of this
paper hold generally for all x in {y : y ∈ Ω,∀θ′∈Θf (y; θ′) > 0}. Both Θ and Ω
are nonempty. If imprecise hypotheses are under consideration, the probability
distributions that determine the values of L are incomplete (3).
2.1.2 Hypothesis types
Deﬁnition 1. For any nonempty subset Θ′ of Θ, the hypothesis that θ ∈ Θ′
is simple if Θ′ has only one element; otherwise, the hypothesis that θ ∈ Θ′
is composite. A simple or composite hypothesis θ ∈ Θ′ is intrinsically simple
if the sampling model implies that θ, conditional on θ ∈ Θ′, is a random D-
tuple of some probability space (Θ′,A′, p′). A composite hypothesis that is not
intrinsically simple is complex.
As will become clear in Example 6, distinguishing composite hypotheses that
are intrinsically simple from those that are complex facilitates inference about
a random θ with frequency distribution p, not to be confused with any prior
distribution pi that is not a feature of the sampling model. Thereby diﬀerenti-
ating the physical distribution p from the mental distribution pi (?) plays a
crucial role in the framework of Section 2.2.
If θ is in fact random with marginal probability space (Θ,A, p), then the hy-
pothesis θ ∈ Θ′ will not be of interest unless Θ′ ∈ A\∅. To succinctly represent
the hypotheses of potential interest, let Φ = {ϕ (Θ′) : Θ′ ∈ A\∅} denote a pa-
rameter set isomorphic to A\∅, where ϕ is an invertible A-measurable function.
Consider the family
{
Pφ : φ ∈ Φ
}
of probability distributions of X that admit
probability density or mass functions
{
f (•;φ) : φ ∈ Φ} satisfying
f (x;φ′) =
∫
f (x; θ′) dp
(
θ′|θ ∈ ϕ−1 (φ′)) (2.1)
for all φ′ ∈ Φ. Then the likelihood function on Φ is L (•) = L (•;x) = f (x; •).
Thus, every intrinsically simple hypothesis θ ∈ Θ′ under the ﬁrst family of
sampling distributions corresponds to a simple hypothesis φ = ϕ (Θ′) under the
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new family. By contrast, a complex hypothesis cannot be reduced to a simple
hypothesis.
Whether θ ∈ Θ′ means θ that is in Θ′ or the hypothesis that θ is in Θ′ may
be determined from the context. In the sequel, every subset of Θ is nonempty
and corresponds to either a simple hypothesis or a composite hypothesis of
potential interest. Accordingly, 2Θ denotes the set of all non-empty subsets of
Θ if θ is ﬁxed or A\∅ if θ is random, in which case all Θ′ ⊆ Θ stands for all
Θ′ ∈ A\∅.
2.2 Explanatory theory of evidence
Section 2.2.1 will formalize the concept of explanatory power that will be used
in Section 2.2.2 to deﬁne the weight of evidence. For the sake of applications,
Section 2.2.3 expresses the weight of evidence more concisely.
2.2.1 Inference to the best explanation
Let ex (Θ′) = ex (Θ′;x) denote the explanatory power of θ ∈ Θ′ with respect
to X = x, that is, the ability of θ ∈ Θ′ to explain why x was observed as
opposed to some other realization of X. The function ex on 2Θ × Ω will be
restricted by weak conditions needed for use with the weight of evidence. To
motivate the condition that pertains speciﬁcally to simple hypotheses, measures
of explanatory power proposed by Popper (2002, Appendix IX) and Niiniluoto
(2004) will exemplify the concept.
Example 2. Niiniluoto (2004) recorded two functions that quantify the ability of
a simple hypothesis to explain data. The one that does not necessitate assigning
probabilities to hypotheses is now generalized to continuous parameter values.
Let f (x) =
∫
f (x; θ) dpi (θ), where pi is a non-Dirac measure on Θ and f (•; θ)
is a probability mass function. Then
ex ({θ′} ;x) = f (x; θ
′)− f (x)
1− f (x) (2.2)
is the explanatory power of θ = θ′ with respect to X = x.
Example 3. Also with discrete data and parameters in mind, Popper (2002,
pp. 416, 420-421) considered
ex ({θ′} ;x) = f (x; θ
′)− f (x)
f (x; θ′) + f (x)
;
ex ({θ′} ;x) = log2
(
f (x; θ′)
f (x)
)
as two possible values of explanatory power that are equally applicable to con-
tinuous data and parameters.
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Since ex will only serve to rank hypotheses, the measure pi deﬁning f (x)
in the examples need neither be speciﬁed nor included in the simple-hypothesis
axiom to be included in the deﬁnition of ex. Intrinsically simple hypotheses are
replaced with the equivalent simple hypotheses for application of that axiom.
A strong idealization of the principle of inference to the best explanation
stipulates that the simple hypothesis of highest explanatory power be inferred
(Niiniluoto, 2004). The complex-hypothesis axiom of the explanatory function
ex weakens that idealization by stipulating only that the ability of θ ∈ Θ′ to
explain X = x cannot exceed that of θ ∈ Θ′′, where Θ′′ contains a parameter
value of highest explanatory power, unless either θ ∈ Θ′ or θ ∈ Θ′′ is intrinsically
simple.
For application to both simple hypotheses and composite hypotheses ac-
cording to the above sketch, ex satisﬁes the conditions imposed by the following
recursive deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4. A function ex on 2Θ×Ω is an explanatory function if it satisﬁes
the following axioms:
1. ex ({θ′} ;x) : Θ→ R1 increases monotonically with the likelihood function
L as θ′ ∈ Θ varies.
2. For all Θ′ ⊆ Θ and Θ′′ ⊆ Θ such that each of the hypotheses θ ∈ Θ′ and
θ ∈ Θ′′ is either simple or complex,
arg sup
θ∈Θ′∪Θ′′
ex ({θ} ;x) ∈ Θ′′ =⇒ ex (Θ′;x) ≤ ex (Θ′′;x) . (2.3)
3. For all Θ′ ⊆ Θ such that θ ∈ Θ′ is an intrinsically simple hypotheses,
ex (Θ′;x) = ex ({ϕ (Θ′)} ;x) (2.4)
where ex is an explanatory function on {{φ} : φ ∈ Φ} × Ω.
Equation (2.4) says the explanatory power of an intrinsically simple hypoth-
esis is equal to that of the equivalent simple hypothesis about the parameter in
the family of distributions induced by equation (2.1).
Violation of equation (2.3) would mean there is a simple or complex hy-
pothesis that explains the data better than a simple or complex hypothesis that
contains the best explanation.
2.2.2 Evidential functions
Let W (Θ′,Θ′′) = W (Θ′,Θ′′;x) denote the weight of evidence in X = x that
supports θ ∈ Θ′ over θ ∈ Θ′′. In the terminology of Section 2.2.1, the evidential
function W is now deﬁned in terms of the explanatory function ex that yields
ex (Θ′;x) as the power of the hypothesis θ ∈ Θ′ to explain why X = x.
Deﬁnition 5. A function W on 2Θ × 2Θ × Ω is an evidential function with
respect to an explanatory function ex if it satisﬁes the following axioms:
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1. For all θ′ ∈ Θ and θ′′ ∈ Θ,
W ({θ′} , {θ′′} ;x) = L (θ
′;x)
L (θ′′;x)
. (2.5)
2. For all Θ′,Θ′′,Θ′′′ ⊆ Θ,
W (Θ′,Θ′′;x) = W (Θ′′,Θ′;x) ⇐⇒ W (Θ′,Θ′′′;x) = W (Θ′′,Θ′′′;x)
⇐⇒ W (Θ′′′,Θ′;x) = W (Θ′′′,Θ′′;x).
(2.6)
3. For all Θ′,Θ′′ ⊆ Θ,
W (Θ′,Θ′′;x) ≤W (Θ′′,Θ′;x) ⇐⇒ ex (Θ′;x) ≤ ex (Θ′′;x) . (2.7)
4. For all Θ′,Θ′′ ⊆ Θ such that θ ∈ Θ′ and θ ∈ Θ′′ are intrinsically simple
hypotheses,
W (Θ′,Θ′′;x) = W ({ϕ (Θ′)} , {ϕ (Θ′′)} ;x) (2.8)
where W is any evidential function on {{φ} : φ ∈ Φ}2 × Ω.
According to equation (2.5) , the likelihood ratio W ({θ′} , {θ′′}) is the weight
of evidence in X = x that supports θ = θ′ over θ = θ′′; this special law of like-
lihood is restricted to the special case of simple hypotheses (1.1.1). Equation
(2.5) calibrates the weight of evidence for one simple hypothesis over another.
The special law of likelihood does not in itself specify how to weigh evidence
for or against a complex hypothesis (Royall, 2000b; Blume, 2002) unless all pa-
rameter values represented by the complex hypothesis have the same likelihood
(Royall, 1997, pp. 17-18).
By contrast, Deﬁnition 5 does apply to composite hypotheses. Speciﬁcally,
the principle of inference to the best explanation idealized by equation (2.3)
extends the special law of likelihood to complex hypotheses, whereas intrinsi-
cally simple hypotheses are replaced with simple hypotheses in accordance with
equation (2.1).
Following Jeﬀreys (1948) with the weight of evidence in place of the Bayes
factor and with a slight change of wording, the number of achieved bans (b = log10W (Θ
′,Θ′′))
indicates weak evidence (0 < |b| < 1/2), moderate evidence (1/2 ≤ |b| < 1), strong
evidence (1 ≤ |b| < 3/2), very strong evidence (3/2 ≤ |b| < 2), or decisive evi-
dence (|b| ≥ 2) supporting θ ∈ Θ′ over θ ∈ Θ′′ if b > 0 or supporting θ ∈ Θ′′
over θ ∈ Θ′ if b < 0.
Example 6. Let Θ = {1, . . . , 101} correspond to 101 urns, each containing
black balls and white balls. An urn is selected randomly, with known probability
p (i) = 1/101 of selecting the ith urn. A ball is then randomly drawn with an
equal probability of drawing any ball from the selected urn θ, as in Kyburg and
Teng (2001, p. 216). The proportion of black balls in the ﬁrst urn is 10−0.8,
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and the proportion of black balls in each other urn is 10−2. Consider the simple
hypothesis that θ = 1 and the composite hypothesis that θ ∈ {1, 2}. The latter
is not the complex hypothesis that the ball was drawn either from the ﬁrst urn
or the second urn but rather is the intrinsically simple hypothesis that the ball
was randomly selected either from the ﬁrst urn with 50% probability or from the
second urn with 50% probability. Thus, equation (2.8) pertains, and if a black
ball is drawn, then
W ({1} , {1, 2} ; black) = W ({φ1} , {φ1,2} ; black)
=
f (black;φ1)
f (black;φ1,2)
=
f (black; 1)
(50%) f (black; 1) + (50%) f (black; 2)
=
10−0.8
(10−0.8 + 10−2) /2
≈ 2 ∈
(
0, 101/2
)
where φ = φ1 and φ = φ1,2 are the two hypotheses in the new parameterization
in the notation of Section 2.1.2. In words, drawing a black ball weakly supports
the hypothesis that the ball was drawn from the ﬁrst urn over the hypothesis that
the ball was randomly selected either from the ﬁrst urn with 50% probability or
from the second urn with 50% probability. Again applying Deﬁnition 5 gives
W ({1} , {2, . . . , 100} ; black) = 10
−0.8
10−2
= 101.2 ≥ 101,
showing that drawing a black ball strongly supports the hypothesis that the ball
was randomly selected from the ﬁrst urn over the hypothesis that was selected
randomly from one of the other urns.
Popper (2002, p. 430) anticipated a special case of Deﬁnition 5 by noting
that the explanatory power can be interpreted as a measure of the weight of
the evidence in favor of the hypothesis. From that perspective, the weight of
evidence for one hypothesis over another may be deemed synonymous with the
explanatory power of the former hypothesis relative to the latter hypothesis,
thereby obviating normalization by f (x). However, the simple identiﬁcation
of the weight of evidence with relative explanatory power breaks down in the
presence of a nuisance parameter (2.5.2).
The evidential functions on 2Θ×2Θ×Ω should not be confused with the evi-
dence functions on Θ×Θ×Ω that Lele (2004) studied. Deﬁnition 5 may extend
the latter to composite hypotheses by substituting each evidence function for
the likelihood ratio in equation (2.5) and by making the analogous modiﬁcation
to the likelihood axiom of equation (4).
2.2.3 General law of likelihood
Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 lead to two practical equations for weighing evidence
favoring one hypotheses over another:
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Proposition 7. General law of likelihood. For any explanatory function ex, let
W denote the evidential function with respect to ex. Then the weight of evidence
in X = x that supports θ ∈ Θ′ over θ ∈ Θ′′ is
W (Θ′,Θ′′;x) =
supθ′∈Θ′ L (θ
′;x)
supθ′′∈Θ′′ L (θ′′;x)
(2.9)
for all Θ′ ⊆ Θ and Θ′′ ⊆ Θ such that θ ∈ Θ′ and θ ∈ Θ′′ is each either a simple
hypothesis or a complex hypothesis but is
W (Θ′,Θ′′;x) =
∫
Θ′ L (θ
′;x) dp (θ′|θ ∈ Θ′)∫
Θ′′ L (θ
′′;x) dp (θ′′|θ ∈ Θ′′) (2.10)
for all Θ′ ⊆ Θ and Θ′′ ⊆ Θ such that θ ∈ Θ′ and θ ∈ Θ′′ are intrinsically simple.
Proof. In the case that θ ∈ Θ′ and θ ∈ Θ′′ are intrinsically simple, equations
(2.8), (2.1), and (2.5) together entail equation (2.10). The remainder of the
proof derives equation (2.9) for the case that θ ∈ Θ′ and θ ∈ Θ′′ is each either
a simple hypothesis or a complex hypothesis. By equation (2.3),
θ′ = arg sup
θ∈Θ′
ex ({θ}) =⇒ ex (Θ′) = ex ({θ′})
for all Θ′ ⊆ Θ. Then, according to Deﬁnition 4 and equation (2.7),
θ′ = arg sup
θ∈Θ′
L (θ) =⇒ W (Θ′, {θ′}) = W ({θ′} ,Θ′) ,
which, by equation (2.6), in turn yields
θ′ = arg sup
θ∈Θ′
L (θ) =⇒ W (Θ′,Θ′′) = W ({θ′} ,Θ′′)
and, similarly,
θ′′ = arg sup
θ∈Θ′′
L (θ) =⇒ W (Θ′,Θ′′) = W (Θ′, {θ′′})
for all Θ′,Θ′′ ⊆ Θ. Combining results,
W (Θ′,Θ′′) = W
({
arg sup
θ∈Θ′
L (θ)
}
,
{
arg sup
θ∈Θ′′
L (θ)
})
and thus, from equation (2.5),
W (Θ′,Θ′′) =
L (arg supθ∈Θ′ L (θ))
L (arg supθ∈Θ′′ L (θ))
.
The proof does not depend on the exact form of the explanatory power of
a simple hypothesis but only requires that it monotonically increase with the
likelihood (Deﬁnition 4). See Foster (2004) for a defense of that requirement.
The connection to the principle of inference to the best explanation largely
answers the objection that an explanatory rationale for equation (2.9) has no
strong logical grounding (Lehmann, 2006).
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2.3 Implications of the theory
2.3.1 Properties of the weight of evidence
The coherence of the weight of evidence follows trivially from Proposition 7.
Proposition 8. Coherence. For any explanatory function ex, let W denote the
evidential function with respect to ex. Given any simple or complex hypotheses
θ ∈ Θ′ and θ ∈ Θ′′,
∀Θ′′,Θ′′′⊆Θ∀Θ′⊆Θ′′W (Θ′,Θ′′′;x) ≤W (Θ′′,Θ′′′;x) . (2.11)
The coherence property prevents attributing more evidence to a simple or
complex hypothesis than to an implication of that hypothesis (Schervish, 1996;
Lavine and Schervish, 1999), as noted in Section 1.1. It now becomes clear that
the Bayes factor fails to qualify as a coherent measure of evidence:
Proposition 9. Let WBF (Θ
′,Θ′′;x) be the Bayes factor
WBF (Θ
′,Θ′′;x) =
∫
Θ′ f (x; θ
′) dpi′ (θ′)∫
Θ′′ f (x; θ
′′) dpi′′ (θ′′)
,
where pi′ and pi′′ are the prior distributions of θ on Θ′ and Θ′′, respectively.
Equation (2.11) would not hold if W = WBF.
Proof. If there is a unique maximum likelihood value, θ̂, and if pi′′ on Θ has
support outside θ = θ̂, then
WBF
({
θ̂
}
,Θ;x
)
=
L
(
θ̂;x
)
∫
Θ
L (θ′′;x) dpi′′ (θ′′)
> 1.
Therefore, ∀Θ′′′⊆ΘWBF
({
θ̂
}
,Θ′′′;x
)
> WBF (Θ,Θ
′′′;x) even though
{
θ̂
}
⊂ Θ,
against Proposition 8.
While a ratio of posterior probabilities satisﬁes coherence (1.1), it generally
violates the principle of inference to the best explanation.
Example 10. Let Θ =
{
θ(1), . . . , θ(101)
}
correspond to 101 distinct cosmo-
logical theories, each providing a diﬀerent physical explanation of astronomical
observations represented by x. The outcome X = x would occur with proba-
bility 10−0.8 on the big bang theory
(
θ = θ(1)
)
and 10−2 on each of the other
100 theories, including the steady state theory
(
θ = θ(2)
)
. If the theories were
judged equally plausible before the measurements were made, each would have
equal prior probability. Then the Bayes factor would incoherently ascribe more
evidential weight to the big bang than to the hypothesis that either the big bang
or the steady state theory is true:
WBF
({
θ(1)
}
,
{
θ(1), θ(2)
}
;x
)
=
10−0.8
(10−0.8 + 10−2) /2
≈ 2.
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The ratio of posterior probabilities is coherent:
pi
(
θ = θ(1)|x)
pi
(
θ ∈ {θ(1), θ(2)} |x) = 10−0.810−0.8 + 10−2 ≤ 1.
However, the posterior odds fails to ascribe more weight to the big bang than to
its denial, revealing a conﬂict between the principle of insuﬃcient reason and
the principle of inference to the best explanation:
pi
(
θ = θ(1)|x)
pi
(
θ 6= θ(1)|x) = 10−0.8(100) (10−2) = 10−0.8 < 1.
Few scientists would let a plethora of less adequate explanations prevent them
from making an inference to the best explanation, the merits of Bayesianism
in other settings notwithstanding. By contrast, the general law of likelihood
indicates that there is strong evidence that the big bang occurred:
W
({
θ(1)
}
,
{
θ(2), . . . , θ(101)
}
;x
)
=
10−0.8
10−2
= 101.2.
The Bayesian approach treats the theories of Example 10 exactly as if they
were the randomly selected urns of Example 6, as seen in the mathematical
equality of the results. Bayesianism has long been criticized for its inability to
distinguish between frequencies of parameter values and levels of belief about
parameter values (e.g., Kardaun et al., 2003). While no prior distribution can
encode a lack of information (Kass and Wasserman, 1996; Bernardo, 1997), a
constant likelihood function does do so (Edwards, 1992, 4.5).
In order to establish two more properties of the weight of evidence, the
probability of observing misleading evidence mentioned in Section 1.1 is now
deﬁned more generally.
Deﬁnition 11. For any Θ′ ⊆ Θ, Θ′′ ⊆ Θ, and Λ > 1, the probability of
observing misleading evidence in X = x that supports θ ∈ Θ′ over θ ∈ Θ′′ at
level Λ with respect to some θ in Θ′′ is
αθ (Λ; Θ
′,Θ′′) = Pθ (W (Θ′,Θ′′;X) ≥ Λ) ,
where X has probability density or mass function f (•; θ).
As argued in Section 1.1, the weight of evidence is diﬃcult to interpret un-
less the probability of observing misleading approaches 0 asymptotically. That
interpretability condition is satisﬁed in the case that one of two mutually exclu-
sive hypotheses is a composite hypothesis corresponding to a parameter interval.
The proof is facilitated by ﬁrst noting that the weight of evidence almost always
asymptotically selects the correct hypothesis:
Proposition 12. Consistency. For any Θ′′ ⊂ Θ such that its interior int Θ′′
contains θ,
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lim
n→∞Pθ (W (Θ\Θ
′′,Θ′′) < 1) = lim
n→∞Pθ (W (Θ
′′,Θ\Θ′′) > 1) = 1 (2.12)
under regularity conditions ensuring the weak consistency of θ̂(n), the maximum
likelihood estimate of θ.
Proof. The weak consistency of θ̂(n) implies limn→∞ Pθ
(
θ̂(n) ∈ int Θ′′
)
= 1.
Equation (2.12) then follows from Proposition 7.
Proposition 13. Interpretability. For any Θ′′ ⊂ Θ such that its interior int Θ′′
contains θ,
lim
n→∞αθ (Λ; Θ\Θ
′′,Θ′′) = 0
for all Λ > 1 under regularity conditions ensuring the weak consistency of the
maximum likelihood estimate of θ.
Proof. By Proposition 12,
Λ > 1 =⇒ lim
n→∞Pθ (W (Θ\Θ
′′,Θ′′) ≥ Λ) = 0.
2.3.2 Likelihood sets
The concept of the likelihood set is closely related to that of the strength of
evidence for composite hypotheses, as sketched in Section 1.2.
Deﬁnition 14. Given some ﬁxed Λ > 1 and Θ′ ⊆ Θ, the likelihood set of level
Λ for X = x with respect to Θ′ is
E (Λ) = E (Λ;x,Θ′) =
{
θ′′ : θ′′ ∈ Θ, L (θ′′;x) ≥ sup
θ′∈Θ′
L (θ′;x) /Λ
}
.
Deﬁnition 15. Given some ﬁxed β ∈ R1 and Θ′ ⊆ Θ, the β-ban likelihood set
Θ′ is E (10β), its likelihood set of level 10β.
Remark 16. Likewise, the β-bit likelihood set and the β-nat evidence set could
be deﬁned by substituting Λ = 2β and Λ = eβ, respectively. MacKay (2002)
discusses the history of calling logarithmic units bits, bans, or nats, according
to the base of the logarithm.
The likelihood set is used to distinguish parameter values supported by the
data from parameter values less consistent with the data (Fisher, 1973; Barnard,
1967; Hoch and Blume, 2008). Such usage implicitly invokes a method of mea-
suring the strength of evidence of a composite hypothesis in the same way as
rejecting the hypothesis of a parameter value falling outside a 1− α conﬁdence
interval implicitly invokes a hypothesis test with a Type I error rate of α. This
practice is more precisely understood in terms of the weight of evidence for a
composite hypothesis over its negation:
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Proposition 17. If E (Λ) is the likelihood set of level Λ for X = x with respect
to Θ′, then
W (E (Λ) ,Θ′\E (Λ) ;x) > Λ.
Proof. The result follows immediately from Proposition 7 and Deﬁnition 14.
In short, the practice of considering a parameter value insuﬃciently sup-
ported by the data if it falls outside a likelihood set receives some justiﬁcation
from measuring the strength of evidence for a composite hypothesis by its best-
supported parameter value. However, since that practice is equivalent to weigh-
ing evidence for a simple hypothesis against that of a composite hypothesis in
which it is essentially nested, it lacks interpretability in the sense of Sections 1.1
and 2.3.1. Non-interpretable procedures can be unsuitable for sequential data
analysis (2.4.4).
2.3.3 Bioequivalence illustration
Suppose θ is some scalar diﬀerence between two treatments that are considered
bioequivalent if θ− < θ < θ+ for two values θ− and θ+, which are often set by
a regulatory agency. The bioequivalence testing problem is naturally framed as
that of measuring the strength of evidence for θ ∈ (θ−, θ+) over θ 6∈ (θ−, θ+).
In a Neyman-Pearson approach to bioequivalence, θ ∈ (θ−, θ+) is accepted if an
interval of a suﬃcient level of conﬁdence is a subset of (θ−, θ+). Choi et al. (2008)
similarly consider there to be strong evidence of bioequivalence if a likelihood
interval E (Λ) of suﬃciently high level Λ is a subset of (θ−, θ+).
The latter approach is justiﬁed by the following implication of the explana-
tory theory of evidence (2.2). In order to accommodate multidimensional pa-
rameters, the implication is stated in terms of equivalence intervals and likeli-
hood intervals rather than equivalence sets and likelihood sets. Quantifying the
strength of evidence for equivalence, θ ∈ Θ′, over nonequivalence, θ 6∈ Θ′, for
some Θ′ ⊆ Θ corresponds to ﬁnding the likelihood set of highest level that is a
subset of Θ′:
Proposition 18. The weight of evidence in X = x that supports θ ∈ Θ′ over
θ 6∈ Θ′ exceeds Λ if and only if E (Λ), the likelihood set of level Λ, is a subset of
Θ′.
Proof. From E (Λ) ⊆ Θ′, the deﬁnition of a likelihood set gives
∀θ′′ 6∈Θ′∃θ′∈Θ′L (θ′′;x) Λ < L (θ′;x) ,
requiring that supθ′∈Θ′ infθ′′ 6∈Θ′ L (θ′;x) /L (θ′′;x) > Λ, the left-hand side of
which equals W (Θ′,Θ\Θ′;x) by Proposition 7, proving suﬃciency. To prove
necessity, assume there is a value θ′′ that is in E (Λ) but not in Θ′. Given
W (Θ′,Θ\Θ′;x) > Λ, Proposition 7 yields supθ′∈Θ′ L (θ′;x) > ΛL (θ′′;x) since
θ′′ ∈ Θ\Θ′. Because θ′′ ∈ E (Λ) , we have supθ′∈Θ L (θ′;x) ≤ ΛL (θ′′;x), pro-
ducing a contradiction.
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2.4 Multiplicity
2.4.1 Simultaneous inference
In a typical problem commonly encountered in high-dimensional biology, there
are multiple focus subparameters θ1, . . . , θD with the corresponding hypotheses
θ1 ∈ Θ′1, . . . , θD ∈ Θ′D such that θ = 〈θ1, . . . , θD〉 and Θ′1×· · ·×Θ′D ⊂ Θ1×· · ·×
ΘD = Θ. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for multiple hypotheses to hold
simultaneously is that the parameter of interest is in the intersection of their
representative sets. For example, θ1 ∈ Θ′1 and θ2 ∈ Θ′2, i.e., 〈θ1, θ2〉 ∈ Θ′1 ×Θ2
and 〈θ1, θ2〉 ∈ Θ1×Θ′2, if and only if 〈θ1, θ2〉 ∈ (Θ′1 ×Θ2)∩(Θ1 ×Θ′2) = Θ′1×Θ′2.
In the same way, whether one or more of multiple hypotheses holds is equivalent
to whether the parameter of interest is in the union of their representative
sets. The simultaneous inference problem is thereby reduced to a composite
hypothesis problem to which the laws of likelihood apply without modiﬁcation.
According to the models most widely used in bioinformatics, each focus
subparameter generates data independent of the data of the other focus subpa-
rameters:
f (x; θ, γ) =
D∏
i=1
fi (xi; θi, γ) , (2.13)
where 〈x1, . . . , xD〉 = x and fi (•; θi) is the probability density or mass function
of Xi for i ∈ {1, . . . , D}. The likelihood function on Θi is Li = Li (•;xi). Then
the weight of evidence for θi ∈ Θ′i over θi ∈ Θ′′i is simply
Wi (Θ
′
i,Θ
′′
i ) = W (Θ1 × · · · ×Θ′i × · · · ×ΘD,Θ1 × · · · ×Θ′′i × · · · ×ΘD)
=
supθ′i∈Θ′i Li (θ
′
i;xi)
supθ′′i ∈Θ′′i Li (θ
′′
i ;xi)
according to equation (2.9). Likewise, the weight of evidence for θ1 ∈ Θ′1 and
θ2 ∈ Θ′2 over θ1 ∈ Θ′1 alone is
W (Θ′1 ×Θ′2 ×Θ3 × · · · ×ΘD,Θ′1 ×Θ2 × · · · ×ΘD) =
supθ′2∈Θ′2 L2 (θ
′
2;x)
supθ2∈Θ2 L2 (θ2;x)
,
and so on. The weight of evidence for θ1 ∈ Θ′1 and θ2 ∈ Θ′2 over θ1 /∈ Θ′1 and
θ2 /∈ Θ′2 is at least as large as that for θ1 ∈ Θ′1 and θ2 ∈ Θ′2 over θ1 /∈ Θ′1 or
θ2 /∈ Θ′2, that is, with Θ′1 = Θ\Θ′1,
supθ′1∈Θ′1 L1 (θ
′
1)
supθ′′1 /∈Θ′1 L1 (θ
′′
1 )
supθ′2∈Θ′2 L2 (θ
′
2)
supθ′′2 /∈Θ′2 L2 (θ
′′
2 )
≥ supθ′1∈Θ′1 L1 (θ
′
1) supθ′2∈Θ′2 L2 (θ
′
2)
sup〈θ′′1 ,θ′′2 〉∈(Θ′1×Θ)∪(Θ×Θ′2) L1 (θ
′′
1 )L2 (θ
′′
2 )
.
.
Example 19. Supposing D murder trials take place on a certain day, let θi = 0
if the ith defendant is neither guilty of manslaughter nor murder, θi = 1 if guilty
of manslaughter, and θi = 0 if guilty of murder. Since the evidence presented
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in each trial does not depend on that of other trials, the weight of evidence that
defendant i is guilty of murder is
Wi ({2} , {0, 1}) = Li (2;xi)
Li (0;xi) ∨ Li (1;xi) .
The independence condition is not always as appropriate as in the example:
it would produce erroneous results in Example 24.
2.4.2 Multiple-comparison adjustments
It is often maintained that multiple comparisons such as those made in the anal-
ysis of microarray data call for adjustments to reported levels of evidence that
would be obtained for single comparisons. Such adjustments are almost invari-
ably justiﬁed by a desire to control a false discovery rate or other generalized
Type I error rate. For example, Korn and Freidlin (2006) regard the repeated
application of the law of likelihood as highly dangerous since it treats the number
of comparisons performed as evidentially irrelevant. Indeed, because the special
law of likelihood quantiﬁes the strength of evidence associated with each com-
parison rather than controlling a rate of false positives, the strength of evidence
for one hypothesis over another remains the same irrespective of the number
of comparisons made (Blume, 2002). More generally, while the approach based
on the laws of likelihood accounts for data dependence between comparisons
(2.4.1), it is not modiﬁed to control error rates. In fact, the rationale for such
control applies even under the independence of the data associated with each
comparison.
Example 20. Since Korn and Freidlin (2006) liken the problem of multiple
comparisons to that of selective reporting, consider a drug company that repli-
cates N independent microarray experiments each yielding n measured ratios of
expression between paired treatment and control mice for each of D genes under
essentially the same conditions. For the jth experiment, the company calculates
the weight of evidence in expression ratios X
(j)
i = x
(j)
i for θi ∈ Θ′, the hypothe-
sis that the ith gene is diﬀerentially expressed, over θi ∈ Θ′′, the hypothesis that
it is equivalently expressed between treatment and control. However, the com-
pany only reports to the regulatory agency which genes have decisive evidence of
diﬀerential expression within each experiment along with the details of the sta-
tistical model and selection process. For any given gene, the process of selection
clearly has no impact on the probability of observing misleading evidence. Let
y
(j)
i = 1 if the ith gene has decisive evidence of diﬀerential expression in the jth
experiment and y
(j)
i = 0 otherwise. The cumulative weight of evidence in the
censored or reduced data for the ith gene under the simplifying assumption of
19
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
independence (2.13) is
wi (Θ
′
i,Θ
′′
i ) =
supθ′i∈Θ′
∏N
j=1 Pθ′i
(
1[100,∞)
(
W
(
Θ′,Θ′′;X(j)i
))
= y
(j)
i
)
supθ′′i ∈Θ′′
∏N
j=1 Pθ′′i
(
1[100,∞)
(
W
(
Θ′,Θ′′;X(j)i
))
= y
(j)
i
)
=
supθ′i∈Θ′ (αθ′ (100; Θ
′,Θ′′))N1 (1− αθ′ (100; Θ′,Θ′′))N−N1
supθ′′i ∈Θ′′ (αθ′′ (100; Θ
′,Θ′′))N1 (1− αθ′′ (100; Θ′,Θ′′))N−N1
,
where N1 is the number of experiments for which y
(j)
i = 1, in the terminology of
Deﬁnition 11. As N → ∞, N1 → N if θi ∈ Θ′ or N1 → 0 if θi ∈ Θ′′, with the
implication that 1(1,∞) (wi (Θ′i,Θ
′′
i )) is a weakly consistent estimator of 1Θ′ (θ)
by a variant of Proposition 12. From this perspective of estimating 1Θ′ (θ), the
loss in eﬃciency due to the selection-induced data reduction is not addressed by
the control of an error rate.
The evidential interpretation of p-value adjusted for multiple comparisons
has its roots in Fisher's disjunction: if the p-value is low, then either an event
of low probability has occurred or the null hypothesis is false (Fisher, 1925;
Johnstone, 1986; Barnard, 1967). Without some adjustment, a low p-value can
instead occur with high probability given enough tests. Thus, even when the
p-value is understood as a measure of evidence, the multiple testing problem
is formulated in terms of error rate control. If a single hypothesis is tested at
a given signiﬁcance level α, then α is the probability of making a Type I er-
ror under the null hypothesis. However, if multiple hypotheses are each tested
at level α, then the probability of at least one Type I error under the truth
of all null hypotheses is greater than α except in the trivial case of complete
dependence between test statistics. This probability is called the family-wise
error rate (FWER). Consequently, a plethora of methods have been developed
to control the FWER for various assumptions while retaining as much power
to reject the null hypothesis as possible. The control of FWERs has been criti-
cized for admitting many false negatives in order to avoid all false positives in
most samples, and newer criteria for judging signiﬁcance gain power by allowing
more false positives. Such criteria include control of the probability that false
positives exceed a given number or proportion (Van der Laan et al., 2004). A
less conservative multiple comparison procedure controls the false discovery rate
(FDR), the expectation value of the ratio of the number of Type I errors to the
number of rejected null hypotheses (Benjamini and Hochberg, 2000; Benjamini
et al., 2001; Benjamini and Yekutieli, 2005; Yekutieli et al., 2006; Benjamini and
Liu, 1999). The smallest FDR at which a hypothesis is rejected (Storey, 2002)
is oﬀered in many microarray data analysis programs as a corrected or adjusted
p-value; e.g., Pollard et al. (2005). All of these approaches replace control of
the test-wise error rate with control of a diﬀerent Type I error rate, and all may
lead to a corrected p-value for each null hypothesis considered (Van der Laan
et al., 2004).
Considering the p-value as a measure of statistical evidence that must be
adjusted to continue to measure statistical evidence under multiple comparisons
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has been formally justiﬁed as follows. In signiﬁcance testing, the observed p-
value is viewed as the probability that a true null hypothesis would be rejected
under repeated sampling in the hypothetical case that the observed test statistic
happened to lie on the boundary of the rejection region (Cox, 1977). Here, the
rejection region is purely hypothetical since no decision to reject or not reject
the null hypothesis is made on the basis of any error rate actually selected
before observation, as the Neyman-Pearson framework would require. That
signiﬁcance testing interpretation of the p-value lies behind deﬁning the adjusted
p-value of a null hypothesis as the lowest Type I error rate of a test at which the
null hypothesis would be rejected (Shaﬀer, 1995). This overall Type I error rate
is usually a family-wise error rate, a generalization thereof, or a false discovery
rate (Van der Laan et al., 2004). This formalism of deﬁning a corrected p-value
in terms of controlling an error rate is combined with the motivation behind
reporting a corrected p-value rather than a decision on the rejection of the
hypothesis, namely, the corrected p-value quantiﬁes the strength of evidence
against the null hypothesis (Wright, 1992). Evidentially interpreting a p-value
corrected in order to control a hypothetical Type I error rate exempliﬁes what
Goodman (1998) and Johnstone (1986) noted of signiﬁcance testing in general:
Neymanian theory fuels Fisherian practice.
The argument that p-values must be corrected to control a Type I error
rate would obtain even in the absence of information about the distribution of
interest in data from other distributions. This raises the question of whether
an adjusted p-value or an unadjusted quantity such as a raw p-value or likeli-
hood ratio better measures the weight of evidence with respect to one of several
comparisons. Example 19 may clarify the issue. In weighing the evidence for
and against the hypothesis that a defendant is guilty, should the jury take into
account the number of defendants currently under trial for the same crime else-
where in the country, perhaps to control a rate of false convictions, or is that
information irrelevant to task of assessing the strength of evidence for guilt over
innocence in the trial at hand? As Mayo and Cox (2006) argued, while control-
ling family-wise error rates may prove advantageous in certain contexts in which
the goal of data analysis is to determine a course of action, the uncorrected p-
value is more appropriate in contexts where inductive reasoning or evidence
evaluation is the aim. Such clariﬁcation of the purpose behind data analysis
is crucial, for confusing the weight of statistical evidence with how that evi-
dence should be used can have undesired consequences. Since Fisher (1973, pp.
95-96, 103-106), a primary argument for measuring evidential strength rather
than computing optimal decisions has relied on the unpredictability of the use
to which evidence will be put. While the nuisance parameter problem may
often make complete separation between evidence and application impossible
even when guided by the explanatory theory of evidence (2.5), such distinction
remains an ideal worth approaching, at least in basic science.
A non-decision-theoretic context suggesting adjustment of p-values is that in
which it is believed that "most of the individual null hypotheses are essentially
correct" (Cox, 2006, p.88), thereby to some extent combining the strength of
evidence in the data with that of one's prior conﬁdence. The same purpose is
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served more precisely and frankly by assigning prior probability to each of the
null hypotheses in proportion to such conﬁdence (Westfall et al., 1997).
The observation that correcting p-values for selection has decision-theoretic
rather than inferential or evidential rationales does not mean an evidential ratio-
nale for such correction will never be formulated. That would be accomplished
either by arguing without appeal to the control of error rates, to optimality, or
to other decision-theoretic concepts or by demonstrating that the problem of
evidence cannot be separated from the problem of decision. For related discus-
sions on the distinction between the decision problem and the inference problem,
see Fisher (1973), Edwards (1992, Appendix I), Hald (2007), Montazeri et al.
(2010), and Bickel (2010).
Evidential inference based directly on the law of likelihood is only beginning
to ﬁnd applications in extreme multiple comparison situations. Taking a ﬁrst
step, Strug and Hodge (2006) studied the implications of evidential inference as
an alternative to Neyman-Pearson error rate control in linkage analysis. They
ﬁnd that although consideration of error rates informs study design, their use
in correcting p-values distorts the strength of evidence.
2.4.3 Empirical Bayes
The error-control rationale for adjusting p-values is distinct from the rationale
behind empirical Bayes methods formulated in order to "borrow strength" or
available information from distributions besides the distribution corresponding
to the comparison at hand. The latter rationale motivates some applications to
genomic expression data since it is believed that measurements of the expression
of some genes are informative for inference about the expression of other genes.
It is also consistent with the uncontested applicability of Bayes's theorem in the
presence of a distribution of parameter frequencies (Fisher, 1973; Wilkinson,
1977; Edwards, 1992; Kyburg and Teng, 2006; Hald, 2007, p. 36; Fraser, 2009),
a situation in which few would insist on corrections to control the FWER or
FDR when the problem is one of inference rather than decision.
Typical empirical Bayes methods rely on modeling parameter values as ran-
dom variables of a distribution pi not intended to reﬂect actual frequencies under
repeated sampling. While that approach often leads to competitive performance
(Yanofsky and Bickel, 2010; Montazeri et al., 2010) or even optimality under
some class of loss functions, its relevance to objectively weighing evidence has
received little attention. Section 5.2 explores the use of a successful empirical
Bayes method for inference under the special law of likelihood in the context of
microarray data analysis.
2.4.4 Sequential data analysis
The consideration of stopping times in settings involving sequential analysis, like
the that of error rates in settings involving multiple comparisons, is relevant to
study design (Berger and Wolpert, 1988) but not to measuring the strength
of evidence under the likelihood principle (Blume, 2008). An unscrupulous
22
http://biostats.bepress.com/cobra/art71
investigator may attempt to conclude that θ ∈ Θ′ by supplementing a sample of
n− independent and identically distributed (IID) observations x1, . . . , xn− with
additional IID observations xn−+1, . . . , xn just until W (Θ
′,Θ′′) ≥ Λ, called the
stopping condition, where Θ′ ∩Θ′′ = ∅, Θ′ ∪Θ′′ = Θ, and Λ is the desired level
of evidence (Λ > 1).
LetX(n) = 〈X1, . . . , Xn〉 denote the n-tuple of IID random variables of which
x1, . . . , xn are realizations, and assume that θ = Eθ (X1) for some θ ∈ Θ′′ and
that σ2 = varθ (X1) is known and ﬁnite. The probability that the investigator
can ever successfully support the false hypothesis depends on the construction
of Θ′′.
If θ = θ′′ is the hypothesis the investigator endeavors to reject, then Θ′′ =
{θ′′}. For any ﬁnite n− and Λ, the number of additional observations needed
to satisfy the stopping condition will almost surely be ﬁnite according to the
law of the iterated logarithm (Robbins, 1970). In other words, the probability
of eventually observing misleading evidence is 1. By implication, as more data
are obtained indeﬁnitely, a level-Λ likelihood interval that does not contain θ
will almost always occur. An anonymous reviewer pointed out this objection to
likelihood sets as deﬁned in Section 2.3.2.
The ability of the investigator to sample until achieving the desired con-
clusion regardless of the initial study size n− is a consequence of the non-
interpretability of W
(
R1\ {θ′′} , {θ′′}) that was noted in Sections 1.1 and 2.3.1.
It will now be seen that the use of an interpretable weight of evidence solves the
problem.
Proposition 21. For any Θ′′ ⊂ Θ such that its interior int Θ′′ contains θ, any
α ∈ (0, 1], and any Λ > 1, there exists a counting number n− such that
Pθ
(
∃n ∈ {n− + 1, n− + 2, . . . } : W
(
Θ\Θ′′,Θ′′;X(n)
)
≥ Λ
)
≤ α
under regularity conditions ensuring the strong consistency of θ̂(n) = θ̂
(
X(n)
)
,
the maximum likelihood estimate of θ, where X(n) is a random n-tuple on a
basic probability space (Ω,Σ, Pθ).
Proof. Pθ
(
limn→∞ θ̂(n) ∈ int Θ′′
)
= 1 by the strong consistency of θ̂(n), imply-
ing
lim
n−→∞
Pθ
(
∀n ∈ {n− + 1, n− + 2, . . . } : θ̂(n) ∈ Θ′′
)
= 1;
lim
n−→∞
Pθ
(
∃n ∈ {n− + 1, n− + 2, . . . } : W
(
Θ\Θ′′,Θ′′;X(n)
)
> 1
)
= 0.
If the data are censored, e.g., by the drug company of Example 20, just until
satisfying the stopping condition, then the eﬀective sampling model is such that
the observation is
〈
X(N), N
〉
=
〈
x(n), n
〉
, where the reported sample size n is
a realization of the random quantity N . In that case, the likelihood function
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for the purposes of weighing evidence or, alternatively, for performing Bayesian
inference, is speciﬁed by
L
(
θ;
〈
x(n), n
〉)
= f
(
x(n); θ
)
Pθ (N = n)
rather than simply by L
(
θ;x(n)
)
= f
(
X(n) = x(n); θ
)
, as in the absence of cen-
soring. To see that in the discrete-data case, note that Pθ
(
X(N) = x(n), N = n
)
=
Pθ
(
X(N) = x(n)|N = n)Pθ (N = n). The factor Pθ (N = n) automatically ac-
counts for the stopping rule without any ad hoc adjustments.
2.5 Nuisance parameters
2.5.1 Elimination of nuisance parameters
Suppose the family of distributions is parameterized by a free nuisance param-
eter γ ∈ Γ ⊆ R1ν as well as by the free interest parameter θ ∈ Θ ⊆ R1D such
that neither θ nor γ is a function of the other parameter; both ν and D are
ﬁxed positive integers. The likelihood function corresponding to each proba-
bility density or mass function f (•; θ, γ) on Ω is ` (•) = ` (•;x) = f (x; •) on
Θ× Γ.
The problem of measuring the weight of evidence in the presence of a nui-
sance parameter has been posed as a problem of approximating the weight of
evidence that would be in the data were the value of the nuisance parameter
known (Tsou and Royall, 1995). The nuisance parameter is often eliminated by
replacing the unknown likelihood function ` on Θ×Γ with a known reduced like-
lihood function L on Θ such as an integrated likelihood function, a conditional
likelihood function, a marginal likelihood function, an estimated likelihood func-
tion, or a proﬁle likelihood function.
Applying that approach to composite hypotheses, a reduced likelihood func-
tion is chosen to approximateWγ (Θ
′,Θ′′) = supθ′∈Θ′ ` (θ
′, γ) / supθ′′∈Θ′′ ` (θ
′′, γ),
the weight of evidence for θ ∈ Θ′ over θ ∈ Θ′′, since Wγ (Θ′,Θ′′) is unknown
without knowledge of γ. Some of the reduced likelihood functions provide bet-
ter approximations than others, depending on the sampling model, as will be
seen in Section 2.5.2. Once the nuisance parameters have been eliminated, the
reduced likelihood function L on Θ takes the place of the likelihood function,
yielding supθ′∈Θ′ L (θ
′) / supθ′′∈Θ′′ L (θ
′′) to approximate Wγ (Θ′,Θ′′).
The elimination of nuisance parameters is exempliﬁed here with the pro-
ﬁle likelihood function Lprofile, deﬁned by ∀θ∈ΘLprofile (θ) = Lprofile (θ;x) =
supγ∈Γ ` (θ, γ;x). Under the special law of likelihood, the proﬁle likelihood ratio
Lprofile (θ
′;x) /Lprofile (θ′′;x) serves as a widely applicable approximation to the
weight of evidence in X = x for θ = θ′ over model θ = θ′′. Likewise, the strength
of evidence in X = x that supports θ ∈ Θ′ over θ ∈ Θ′′ may be approximated
by
Wprofile (Θ
′,Θ′′) = Wprofile (Θ′,Θ′′;x) =
supθ′∈Θ′ Lprofile (θ
′;x)
supθ′′∈Θ′′ Lprofile (θ′′;x)
. (2.14)
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provided that each hypothesis is either simple or complex.
Example 22. The normal family. The proposed methodology will be illustrated
with the comparison of the hypotheses |θ| > θ+ and |θ| ≤ θ+ for some θ+ ≥ 0 on
the basis of x =
(
x(1), ..., x(n)
)
, a sample of n independent observations from a
normal distribution with unknown mean θ ∈ R1 and variance γ = σ2 ∈ (0,∞).
Hence, the density function satisﬁes
f
(
x; θ, σ2
)
=
n∏
j=1
1√
2piσ
exp
(
−1
2
(
x(j) − θ
σ
)2)
. (2.15)
Since, as noted in Section 1.2,
Lprofile (θ
′) /Lprofile (θ′′) = (σ̂ (θ′) /σ̂ (θ′′))
−n
,
the strength of evidence for |θ| > θ+ over |θ| ≤ θ+ is
Wprofile
(
R1\ [−θ+, θ+] , [−θ+, θ+]
)
=
infθ′′∈{−θ+,θ+}
(
σ̂
σ̂(θ′′)
)−n ∣∣∣θ̂∣∣∣ > θ+
supθ′∈{−θ+,θ+}
(
σ̂(θ′)
σ̂
)−n ∣∣∣θ̂∣∣∣ ≤ θ+ ,
where θ̂ and σ̂ = σ̂
(
θ̂
)
are the maximum likelihood estimates of θ and σ. In
bioequivalence applications (2.3.3),
Wprofile
(
(−θ+, θ+) ,R1\ (−θ+, θ+)
)
= 1/Wprofile
(
R1\ (−θ+, θ+) , (−θ+, θ+)
)
approximates the evidence for equivalence.
The proﬁle likelihood has several advantages as an approximation: it resem-
bles a likelihood ratio under certain conditions and has a low asymptotic prob-
ability of misleading evidence (Royall, 2000a), and, if the nuisance parameter is
orthogonal to the interest parameter, it is equal to the likelihood ratio (Royall,
1997). For some models, the nuisance parameter may instead be eliminated by
use of a marginal or conditional likelihood (Royall, 1997) as approximations of
the likelihood function without nuisance parameters.
Alternatively, provided a probability distribution or other measure of γ that
is suitable for evidential inference, the nuisance parameter could be eliminated
by integration. Methods have been proposed for specifying a nuisance parameter
distribution or other measure to integrate the likelihood not only for Bayesian
statistics (Kass and Raftery, 1995; Berger et al., 1999; Clyde and George, 2004)
but also for Neyman-Pearson statistics (Severini, 2007, 2010). In fact, the nui-
sance parameter measure need not be a pure prior distribution since it may
depend on data (Kalbﬂeisch and Sprott, 1970; Aitkin, 1991; Dempster, 1997;
Severini, 2007, 2010).
This ﬂexibility of choice in the method for eliminating nuisance parame-
ters allows researchers to tailor data analyses to particular applications such
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as that of Example 24, underscoring the fact that the motivating objectivity
condition of Section 1.1 by no means reduces statistical inference to a series of
automatic calculations. On the other hand, diﬀerent approaches to eliminating
nuisance parameters can yield similar results. For example, likelihoods inte-
grated with respect to certain distributions approximate the proﬁle likelihood
(Severini, 2007).
2.5.2 Other interpretations of proﬁle likelihood
Instead of seeing the proﬁle likelihood as one of many possible approximations
of the unknown likelihood function of the interest parameter, the proﬁle likeli-
hood could be derived from Proposition 2.9 by framing the nuisance parameter
problem as an instance of the composite hypothesis problem as follows. Royall
(1992), He et al. (2007), and Zhang (2009b), contrary to Section 2.5.1, identiﬁed
the weight of evidence for 〈θ, γ〉 ∈ Θ′ × Γ over 〈θ, γ〉 ∈ Θ′′ × Γ with the weight
of evidence for θ ∈ Θ′ over θ ∈ Θ′′, thus assuming that the latter can be pre-
cisely known without knowledge of γ. Under that conﬂation of the problem of
composite hypotheses with the problem of nuisance parameters, equation (2.14)
would exactly specify the weight of evidence for θ ∈ Θ′ over θ ∈ Θ′′, as it does
in the axiomatic system of Zhang (2009b).
However, there are sampling models in which the proﬁle likelihood can fail
to meaningfully measure the weight of evidence (Royall, 2000a; He et al., 2007).
For that reason, Royall (1992) and He et al. (2007) represented the weight of
evidence as an interval of proﬁle likelihood ratios, and the weight was repre-
sented as a single likelihood ratio in Sections 2.2 and 2.5.1 that is unknown if
there is an unknown nuisance parameter. The elimination of a nuisance pa-
rameter γ, whether by proﬁling, integration, or other means, only approximates
Wγ (Θ
′,Θ′′).
The proﬁle likelihood ratio (2.14) would much more plausibly measure the
explanatory power of θ ∈ Θ′ relative to θ ∈ Θ′′ than it would measure the
weight of evidence for θ ∈ Θ′ over θ ∈ Θ′′, provided that each hypothesis is
either simple or complex, as seen in the following examples. More generally, the
relative ability ex (Θ′,Θ′′) of θ ∈ Θ′ compared to θ ∈ Θ′′ to explain X = x, is
supγ′∈Γ exγ′ (Θ
′) / supγ′′∈Γ exγ′′ (Θ
′′), where exγ′ is an explanatory function for
each γ′ ∈ Γ such that exγ′ ({θ′} , {θ′′}) = ` (θ′, γ′) /` (θ′′, γ′) for all θ′′, θ′′ ∈ Θ
and γ′ ∈ Γ, assuming γ is ﬁxed. The weight of evidence nonetheless remains
Wγ (Θ
′,Θ′′), a function of γ.
Example 23. For any single observation x of a normal variate X of unknown
mean γ and variance θ, the proﬁle likelihood would ascribe inﬁnite weight of
evidence in that observation to the hypothesis that θ = 0 over any θ 6= 0, which
is clearly untenable (Royall, 2000a; He et al., 2007). However, the hypothesis
that θ = 0, if true, would explain the observation much better than would any
other simple hypothesis about θ, resonating with interpreting the proﬁle likelihood
ratio as a measure of relative explanatory power.
The Neyman-Scott problem also precludes viewing proﬁle likelihood as evi-
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dence (Royall, 1992; He et al., 2007) but accords with viewing it as explanatory
power. Less pathological problems point to the same conclusion.
Example 24. In a scenario posed by an anonymous reviewer, exactly D insiders
know a secret. The probability that the secret does (x = 1) or does not (x = 0)
leak is
f (x; θ1, . . . , θD) =
{
1 if x = 1−∏Di=1 (1− θi)
0 if x =
∏D
i=1 (1− θi)
where θi = 1 if the ith insider leaks the secret or θi = 0 otherwise. If the secret
leaks (X = 1), the likelihood function is given by
L (θ1, . . . , θD; 1) =
{
1 if
∏D
i=1 (1− θi) = 0
0 if
∏D
i=1 (1− θi) = 1
Thus, the leaking of a secret constitutes irrefutable evidence that at least one of
the insiders leaked it over the hypothesis 〈θ1, . . . , θD〉 = 〈0, . . . , 0〉 that none of
them leaked it:
W
(
{0, 1}D \ {〈0, . . . , 0〉} , {〈0, . . . , 0〉}
)
=
1
0
.
However, the evidence against any given suspect is much weaker. Quantifying
Wi ({1} , {0}), the weight of evidence that θi = 1 over θi = 0, treats θi as the
interest parameter and γ = 〈θ1, . . . , θi−1, θi+1, . . . , θD〉 as the nuisance parame-
ter. In this case, eliminating the latter by means of the proﬁle likelihood (2.5)
yields
Wi ({1} , {0}) =
supγ∈{0,1}D−1 L (θ1, . . . , θi−1, 1, θi+1, . . . , θD; 1)
supγ∈{0,1}D−1 L (θ1, . . . , θi−1, 0, θi+1, . . . , θD; 1)
= 1,
which is reasonable for suﬃciently large D. For small D, the integration method
of eliminating nuisance parameters is more reasonable since it allows Wi ({1} , {0})
to be close to but greater than 1. This can be accomplished without recourse
to subjective or conventional priors by modeling each θi as an independent
Bernoulli random variable of limiting relative frequency p (θi) ∈ (0, 1), entailing
that p (1) or p (0) is the frequentist probability that the ith insider does or does
not reveal the secret. Then the integration method gives
Wi ({1} , {0}) =
∫
L (θ1, . . . , θi−1, 1, θi+1, . . . , θD; 1) dp (θ1) · · · dp (θi−1) dp (θi+1) · · · dp (θD)∫
L (θ1, . . . , θi−1, 0, θi+1, . . . , θD; 1) dp (θ1) · · · dp (θi−1) dp (θi+1) · · · dp (θD)
=
1
1− p (0)D−1
> 1,
approaching the result of the proﬁle likelihood as D → ∞, but Wi ({1} , {0}) =
1/p (1) for D = 2.
Thus, the integrated likelihood is more reasonable than the proﬁle likelihood
for weighing the evidence that a given insider revealed a secret since the use
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of the latter would mean the revelation has no evidence to that eﬀect even if
there were only two insiders. The proﬁle likelihood may nonetheless quantify
explanatory power, in which case the hypothesis that a given insider revealed the
secret would not explain its revelation better than would the hypothesis that he
or she did not reveal it.
3 Inference about imprecise hypotheses
Since the boundary between one composite hypothesis and another is often ar-
bitrary to a large extent, the eﬀect of specifying that boundary will be mitigated
by making it imprecise or, more technically, fuzzy. An objection against the use
of fuzzy logic is that problems solved using fuzzy set theory can be solved using
probability theory instead (Laviolette, 2004). However, whereas in the context
of statistical inference, probability is usually seen in terms of the representation
of uncertainty, there is no uncertainty associated with hypothesis speciﬁcation
as envisioned here. Because the speciﬁcation of hypotheses does not depend on
frequencies of events or levels of belief, fuzzy set membership functions rather
than probability distributions will be used to specify hypotheses in order to
avoid confusion. This approach is in line with traditional interpretations of de-
grees of set membership (Klir, 2004; Nguyen and Walker, 2000) as opposed to
reinterpreting them as degrees of uncertainty as per Singpurwalla and Booker
(2004). By keeping vagueness or imprecision distinct from uncertainty, fuzzy set
theory enables a clearer presentation of the proposed methodology than would
be possible with the probability calculus alone. Thus, the proposed method-
ology remains objective in the sense that the strength of evidence for a given
hypothesis over another given hypothesis does not depend on any researcher's
prior levels of belief even though each given hypothesis may have an imprecise
speciﬁcation.
The use of vague hypotheses to broaden the framework of Section 2 has a
diﬀerent motivation than related work on the interface between statistics and
fuzzy logic. Fuzzy set theory has been used to specify vague hypotheses for gen-
eralizations of both Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing (Romer et al., 1995)
and Bayesian inference (Zadeh, 2002). Similarly, Dollinger et al. (1996) sug-
gested measuring evidence by the extent to which a test statistic falls in a fuzzy
rejection region determined by a ﬁxed Type I error rate; this leads to fuzzy hy-
pothesis tests and fuzzy conﬁdence intervals. Fuzzy hypothesis tests and fuzzy
conﬁdence intervals have also been formulated to overcome a ﬂaw in previous
methods involving discrete distributions (Geyer and Meeden, 2005).
3.1 Incomplete likelihood
A measure P of total mass c =
∫
dP is a complete, incomplete, or strictly
incomplete probability distribution of completeness c if c = 1, 0 < c ≤ 1 or
0 < c < 1, respectively (Rényi, 1970, p. 569). Consider the family{
P〈θ′,c′〉 : θ′ ∈ Θ, c′ ∈ (0, 1]
}
(3.1)
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of incomplete probability distributions on Ω such that P〈θ′,c′〉 (•) = c′P〈θ′,1〉 (•),
where θ′, γ′, and C ′ are the interest parameter value, nuisance parameter value,
and level of completeness that uniquely specify P〈θ′,c′〉, the distribution of X.
Denote each complete distribution P〈θ′,1〉 by Pθ′ . The true sampling distribution
of the X of which x is modeled as a realization is Pθ with θ unknown.
The incomplete likelihood function L˜ (•) = L˜ (•;x) on Θ × (0, 1] satisﬁes
L˜ (θ, c) = f (x; θ, c) for all 〈θ, c〉 ∈ Θ × (0, 1], where f (•; θ, c) is an incomplete
probability mass or density function of P〈θ,c〉. Thus, L˜ (θ;x) = L˜ (•, 1;x) is the
Fisherian or complete likelihood function. For all θ ∈ Θ and C ∈ (0, 1], the
identity L˜ (θ, c;x) = cL˜ (θ;x) follows from the parameterization of the sampling
model (3.1) since it requires that f (x; θ, c) = cf (x; θ, 1).
3.2 Imprecise hypotheses
In order to concisely represent hypothesis imprecision in terms of incomplete
probability distributions, the subsection employs concepts from fuzzy set theory.
Deﬁnition 25. Any measurable function that maps Θ to [0, 1] is a fuzzy subset
of Θ.
Following Nguyen and Walker (2000), this deﬁnition makes no distinction
between a fuzzy subset and its membership function; Θ˜′ (θ) is considered to be
the extent to which θ′ belongs to a fuzzy subset Θ˜′ of Θ, summarized as θ∈˜Θ˜′.
The ∈˜ symbol plays the role of the ∈ symbol in order to specify a hypothesis in
terms of membership in a fuzzy subset, which is literally a function rather than
a set of parameter values. The meaning of the hypothesis θ∈˜Θ˜′ is true to extent
Θ˜′ (θ) depends on whether θ is random according to the sampling model, as
will be seen in the remainder of this subsection. Each such Θ˜′ corresponding to
a hypothesis must be a member of F (Θ), the set of all fuzzy subsets of Θ such
that Θ˜′ ∈ F (Θ) =⇒ ∃θ ∈ Θ : Θ˜′ (θ) = 1.
If θ is random with sampling distribution p and if Θ′ ∈ A, then the general-
ized probability of θ∈˜Θ˜′ conditional on some event X ∈ Ω′ is deﬁned as
P˜
(
θ∈˜Θ˜′|X ∈ Ω′
)
= E
(
Θ˜′ (θ) |X ∈ Ω′
)
,
where P˜ generalizes the probability measure P, an extension of Pθ and p, and
where E is the usual expectation operator E (•) = ∫ •dP. By construction, P˜
obeys Bayes's rule:
P˜
(
X ∈ Ω′|θ∈˜Θ˜′
)
= Pθ (X ∈ Ω′)
E
(
Θ˜′ (θ) |X ∈ Ω′
)
E
(
Θ˜′ (θ)
) .
Accordingly, each P˜
(
X ∈ •|θ∈˜Θ˜′
)
such that Θ˜′ ∈ F (Θ) is assumed to admit
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the generalized probability density or mass function f˜
(
•; ϕ˜
(
Θ˜′
))
satisfying
f˜ (x;φ′) = E (f (x; θ))
E
(
ϕ˜−1 (φ′) (θ) |X = x)
E (ϕ˜−1 (φ′) (θ))
(3.2)
for all x ∈ Ω and φ′ ∈ Φ˜, where Φ˜ is a parameter set isomorphic to F by
the invertible map ϕ˜ : F → Φ˜. Then the generalized likelihood function on Φ˜
for purposes of quantifying evidential weight and explanatory power is L˜ (•) =
L˜ (•;x) = f˜ (x; •). Thus, each composite hypothesis θ∈˜Θ˜′ corresponds to a
simple hypothesis φ = ϕ˜
(
Θ˜′
)
.
For the case of ﬁxed θ, every imprecise hypothesis is equivalent to a precise
hypothesis. Let ξΘ˜′ (θ) =
〈
θ, Θ˜′ (θ)
〉
and Ξ
(
Θ˜′
)
=
{
ξΘ˜′ (θ) : θ ∈ Θ
}
for all
Θ˜′ ∈ F (Θ). Every parameter value ξ in Ξ
(
Θ˜′
)
indexes Pξ, a member of the
family of incomplete probability distributions (3.1). Each imprecise hypothesis
θ∈˜Θ˜′ is called simple, intrinsically simple, or complex if the precise hypothesis
ξΘ˜′ (θ) ∈ Ξ
(
Θ˜′
)
is simple, intrinsically simple, or complex, respectively.
These calibrations of θ∈˜Θ˜′ by distribution completeness values overcome the
objection against fuzzy set theory that it fails to unambiguously assign fractional
membership values (Lindley, 2004). The calibrations facilitate the extension
of evidential theory to imprecise hypotheses by automatically attenuating the
weight of evidence and explanatory power according to the imprecision.
3.3 Extended theory of evidence
For fuzzy subsets Θ˜′, Θ˜′′ ∈ F (Θ), let W˜
(
Θ˜′, Θ˜′′
)
= W˜
(
Θ˜′, Θ˜′′;x
)
denote the
weight of evidence in X = x that supports θ∈˜Θ˜′ over θ∈˜Θ˜′′. The function W˜
is deﬁned by transforming each imprecise hypothesis concerning complete prob-
ability distributions to an equivalent precise hypothesis concerning incomplete
probability distributions in accordance with Section 3.2.
Deﬁnition 26. A function W˜ on F (Θ)×F (Θ)×Ω is the extended evidential
function with respect to an explanatory function ex if it satisﬁes the following
conditions:
1. For all Θ˜′, Θ˜′′ ∈ F (Θ) such that θ∈˜Θ˜′ and θ∈˜Θ˜′′ is each either a simple
hypothesis or a complex hypothesis,
W˜
(
Θ˜′, Θ˜′′;x
)
= W
(
Ξ
(
Θ˜′
)
,Ξ
(
Θ˜′′
)
;x
)
, (3.3)
where W is any evidential function on 2Θ×(0,1] × 2Θ×(0,1] × Ω.
2. For all Θ˜′, Θ˜′′ ∈ F (Θ) such that θ∈˜Θ˜′ and θ∈˜Θ˜′′ are intrinsically simple
hypotheses, let W be any evidential function on
{
{φ} : φ ∈ Φ˜
}2
×Ω deﬁned
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with L˜ as the likelihood function on Φ˜. Then
W˜
(
Θ˜′, Θ˜′′;x
)
= W
({
ϕ˜
(
Θ˜′
)}
,
{
ϕ˜
(
Θ˜′′
)}
;x
)
. (3.4)
The general law of likelihood given by Proposition 7 is now extended to
govern imprecise hypotheses:
Proposition 27. Extended law of likelihood. For any explanatory function ex,
let W denote the evidential function 2Θ×(0,1] × 2Θ×(0,1] × Ω with respect to ex.
Further, let W˜ denote the extended evidential function with respect to ex. Then
the weight of evidence in X = x that supports θ∈˜Θ˜′ over θ∈˜Θ˜′′ is
W˜
(
Θ˜′, Θ˜′′;x
)
=
supθ′∈Θ Θ˜
′ (θ′) L˜ (θ′;x)
supθ′′∈Θ Θ˜′′ (θ′′) L˜ (θ′′;x)
(3.5)
for all fuzzy subsets Θ˜′, Θ˜′′ ∈ F (Θ) such that θ∈˜Θ˜′ and θ∈˜Θ˜′′ is each either a
simple hypothesis or a complex hypothesis but is
W˜
(
Θ˜′, Θ˜′′;x
)
=
∫
Θ˜′ (θ′) dP (θ′|X = x) / ∫ Θ˜′ (θ′) dp (θ′)∫
Θ˜′′ (θ′′) dP (θ′′|X = x) / ∫ Θ˜′′ (θ′′) dp (θ′′) (3.6)
for all Θ′ ⊆ Θ and Θ′′ ⊆ Θ such that θ∈˜Θ˜′ and θ∈˜Θ˜′′ are intrinsically simple.
Proof. The case that θ∈˜Θ˜′ and θ∈˜Θ˜′′ are intrinsically simple hypotheses will be
addressed ﬁrst. Equations (3.4), (2.5) , and (3.2) yield
W˜
(
Θ˜′, Θ˜′′;x
)
=
E
(
Θ˜′ (θ) |X = x
)
/E
(
Θ˜′ (θ)
)
E
(
Θ˜′′ (θ) |X = x
)
/E
(
Θ˜′′ (θ)
) ,
from which equation (3.6) immediately follows. Next consider the case that
θ∈˜Θ˜′ and θ∈˜Θ˜′′ is each either a simple hypothesis or a complex hypothesis.
The hypotheses θ∈˜Θ˜′ and θ∈˜Θ˜′′ are thus shorthand for
〈
θ, Θ˜′ (θ)
〉
∈ Ξ
(
Θ˜′
)
and
〈
θ, Θ˜′′ (θ)
〉
∈ Ξ
(
Θ˜′′
)
, respectively (3.2). By Deﬁnition 26 and equation
(2.9),
W˜
(
Θ˜′, Θ˜′′;x
)
=
sup〈θ,C〉∈Ξ(Θ˜′) L (〈θ, C〉 ;x)
sup〈θ,C〉∈Ξ(Θ˜′′) L (〈θ, C〉 ;x)
.
Since 〈θ, C〉 ∈ Ξ
(
Θ˜′
)
if and only if
〈
θ, Θ˜′ (θ)
〉
∈ Ξ
(
Θ˜′
)
, we have
W˜
(
Θ˜′, Θ˜′′;x
)
=
supθ∈Θ L
(〈
θ, Θ˜′ (θ)
〉
;x
)
supθ∈Θ L
(〈
θ, Θ˜′′ (θ)
〉
;x
)
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in terms of the likelihood function L (〈•〉 ;x) on Θ × (0, 1]. By the equivalence
of L
(〈
θ, Θ˜′ (θ)
〉
;x
)
and L˜
(
θ, Θ˜′ (θ) ;x
)
,
W˜
(
Θ˜′, Θ˜′′;x
)
=
supθ′∈Θ L˜
(
θ′, Θ˜′ (θ′) ;x
)
supθ′′∈Θ L˜
(
θ′′, Θ˜′′ (θ′′) ;x
)
in terms of the (possibly reduced) incomplete likelihood function L˜ (•;x) on
Θ×(0, 1]. Using the identity L˜ (θ, c;x) = cL˜ (θ;x) of Section 3.1 for substitution
completes the proof of equation (3.5).
In the presence of a nuisance parameter, the reduced likelihood function
L˜ (•, C) is formed by eliminating the nuisance parameter in order to approxi-
mate the weight of evidence, analogous to the precise hypothesis case of Sec-
tion 2.5. Then each L˜ (θ, C) is a function of the distributions indexed by the
same interest parameter value and with the same level of completeness but
not a function of other members of the family of incomplete probability dis-
tributions. The method of nuisance parameter elimination must also preserve
L˜ (θ, C;x) = CL˜ (θ, 1;x) for all θ ∈ Θ and C ∈ (0, 1]. The application of
equation (3.5) in the presence of a nuisance parameter is illustrated in Section
5.1.
4 Simulation study
To quantify the impact of replacing a simple hypothesis with a small-interval
composite hypothesis in evidential inference, a series of simulations were carried
out for the case of normal distributions (Example 22). M = 105 independent
samples of independent standard normal observations were randomly generated
for each of 23 sample sizes from n = 2 to n = 10, 000. Given samples x1, ..., xM ,
each of size n, and a threshold of b bans of evidence for θ 6= 0 over θ = 0, the
probability of observing misleading evidence was computed by
α̂Θ
′′
n (b) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
1[10b,∞)
(
Wprofile
(
R1\Θ′′,Θ′′;xi
))
(4.1)
with Θ′′ = {0} for the composite-simple hypothesis pair or with Θ′′ = [−1/10, 1/10]
for the composite-composite hypotheses pair. The levels of evidence were chosen
to correspond to the probabilities of observing at least weak evidence (b = 1/∞),
at least moderate evidence (b = 1/2), at least strong evidence (b = 1), at least
very strong evidence (b = 3/2), and decisive evidence (b = 2). Every observa-
tion of evidence favoring θ 6= 0 or |θ| > 1/10 at any level is misleading since the
data were generated under θ = 0.
The results are displayed as Figures 4.1-4.5, with one ﬁgure per level of
evidence. Figure 4.1 highlights the most obvious discrepancy between the two
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choices of hypothesis pairs. Since the maximum likelihood estimate almost never
equals 0, the evidence favors θ 6= 0 over θ = 0 with probability 1. By contrast,
the evidence usually favors |θ| ≤ 1/10 over |θ| > 1/10, except for small samples.
At the higher evidence grades, Figures 4.2-4.5 also show that the probability
of observing evidence for the incorrect hypothesis decreases as the sample size
increases for Θ′′ = [−1/10, 1/10], as expected from Proposition 13, but not for
Θ′′ = {0}, with the exception of smaller samples.
Figure 4.6 focuses on the comparison between and approximate evidence for
sample sizes common in experimental biology. Its plots for n = 5 and n = 6 are
directly relevant to the application of the next section.
5 Application to gene expression data
5.1 Evidence of diﬀerential expression
In this section, the theory of Sections 2 and 3 is illustrated with tomato gene
expression data described in Alba et al. (2005). Dual-channel microarrays were
used to measure the mutant-to-wild-type expression ratios of 13, 440 genes at
the breaker stage of ripening and at 3 and 10 days thereafter. Each of the
later two stages has six biological replicates (n = 6), but one of the biological
replicates is missing at the breaker stage of ripening (n = 5).
For each of the three time points, there are two competing hypotheses per
gene: the geometric mean of the expression ratio between mutant tomatoes
and wildtype tomatoes is either 1 (the simple hypothesis corresponding to no
mutation eﬀect) or is not 1 (the composite hypothesis corresponding to a mu-
tation eﬀect). Since the data are approximately lognormal, the relevant family
of distributions for each gene i is that of equation (2.15), replacing θ with θi,
the logarithm of geometric mean of the expression ratio of the ith gene, and
replacing x with xi, each component of which is the logarithm of an observed
expression ratio of the ith gene. The maximum likelihood estimate of θi is θ̂i,
the sample mean of the logarithms of the expression ratios for the ith gene. The
commonly made independence assumption of Section 2.4, although known to be
incorrect, remains a useful approximation in the absence of suﬃciently large n
to reliably estimate gene-gene interactions.
Like in the simulation study of the last section, equation (2.14) gives the
strength of evidence for diﬀerential expression between the wild type and the
mutant (θi 6= 0) over equivalent expression (θi = 0). Since, however, the ex-
pression ratio is not exactly 1, Bickel (2004), Lewin et al. (2006), Van De Wiel
and Kim (2007), Bochkina and Richardson (2007), and McCarthy and Smyth
(2009) redeﬁned what is meant by "diﬀerential expression" by employing some
biologically relevant value θ+ > 0. Accordingly, equation (2.14) also yields the
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Figure 4.1: Probabilities α̂
{0}
n (1/∞) and α̂[−1/10,1/10]n (1/∞) of observing any
misleading positive evidence for the hypothesis that θ 6= 0 over the "simple"
hypothesis that θ = 0 and for the hypothesis that |θ| > 1/10 over the "compos-
ite" hypothesis that |θ| ≤ 1/10, respectively.
34
http://biostats.bepress.com/cobra/art71
Figure 4.2: Probabilities α̂
{0}
n (1/2) and α̂
[−1/10,1/10]
n (1/2) of observing mislead-
ing moderate or stronger evidence for the hypothesis that θ 6= 0 over the
"simple" hypothesis that θ = 0 and for the hypothesis that |θ| > 1/10 over
the "composite" hypothesis that |θ| ≤ 1/10, respectively. The horizontal gray
line is drawn at limn→∞,M→∞ α̂
{0}
n (1/2) according to the χ2 distribution with
1 degree of freedom; limn→∞,M→∞ α̂
[−1/10,1/10]
n (1/2) = 0 by Proposition 13.
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Figure 4.3: Probabilities α̂
{0}
n (1) and α̂
[−1/10,1/10]
n (1) of observing misleading
strong, very strong, or decisive evidence for the hypothesis that θ 6= 0 over
the "simple" hypothesis that θ = 0 and for the hypothesis that |θ| > 1/10 over
the "composite" hypothesis that |θ| ≤ 1/10, respectively.
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Figure 4.4: Probabilities α̂
{0}
n (3/2) and α̂
[−1/10,1/10]
n (3/2) of observing mislead-
ing very strong or decisive evidence for the hypothesis that θ 6= 0 over the
"simple" hypothesis that θ = 0 and for the hypothesis that |θ| > 1/10 over the
"composite" hypothesis that |θ| ≤ 1/10, respectively.
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Figure 4.5: Probabilities α̂
{0}
n (2) and α̂
[−1/10,1/10]
n (2) of observing misleading
decisive evidence for the hypothesis that θ 6= 0 over the "simple" hypothe-
sis that θ = 0 and for the hypothesis that |θ| > 1/10 over the "composite"
hypothesis that |θ| ≤ 1/10, respectively.
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Figure 4.6: Probabilities α̂
{0}
n (b) and α̂
[−1/10,1/10]
n (b) of observing misleading
evidence for the hypothesis that θ 6= 0 over the "simple" hypothesis that θ = 0
and for the hypothesis that |θ| > 1/10 over the "composite" hypothesis that
|θ| ≤ 1/10, respectively, for each of the evidence levels b of Figures 1-5 and at
each of three sample sizes (n ∈ {4, 5, 6}).
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strength of evidence for biologically signiﬁcant diﬀerential expression between
the wild type and the mutant (|θi| > θ+) over biologically insigniﬁcant diﬀer-
ential expression (|θi| ≤ θ+). Due to the importance of the twofold change in
biochemistry, θ+ is here set to
1
2 log 2, the midpoint between 0 and log 2. (Simi-
larly, Lewin et al. (2006) and Bochkina and Richardson (2007) derived posterior
probabilities that |θi| > log 2, and Bickel (2004), Van De Wiel and Kim (2007),
and McCarthy and Smyth (2009) considered false discovery rates for which a
"discovery" is deﬁned in terms of fold change thresholds.)
As seen in Figure 5.1, the use of |θi| > log
√
2 rather than |θi| > 0 as the hy-
pothesis corresponding to diﬀerential expression leads to considering many fewer
genes diﬀerentially expressed at each stage of maturity and at each level of evi-
dence. Now the composite hypotheses for gene i are θi ∈ Θ′ = R1\
[− log√2, log√2]
and θi ∈ Θ′′ =
[− log√2, log√2]. There is an order of magnitude more
genes counted as diﬀerentially expressed at each evidence grade when using
Wprofile
(
R1\ {0} , {0} ;xi
)
than when using Wprofile (Θ
′,Θ′′;xi) as the strength
of evidence in xi, the data for the ith gene.
The left-hand-side of Figure 5.2 stresses the main limitation of comparing two
composite hypotheses: the results depend on the speciﬁcation of θ+, the value
that determines the sharp boundary between equivalent expression (|θi| ≤ θ+)
and diﬀerential expression (|θi| > θ+) ; in this case, θ+ = log
√
2. By instead
allowing degrees of whether a gene is diﬀerentially expressed, the approach of
Section 3 mitigates this eﬀect. For correspondence with the above analyses with
precise hypotheses, a gene is considered diﬀerentially expressed to extent
Θ˜′ (θ) =
{
|θ| / log 2 |θ| ≤ log 2
1 |θ| > log 2
and equivalently expressed to extent Θ˜′′ (θ) = 1 − Θ˜′ (θ), as illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.3. Sokhansanj et al. (2004) instead considered a fuzzy subset on gene
expression measurements that would only achieve full expression membership
for inﬁnite measurements. By contrast, Θ˜′ considers all genes with two-fold
or greater diﬀerential expression between populations to be fully diﬀerentially
expressed.
The success in eliminating the undesirable discontinuity at the rigid bound-
ary between hypotheses is evident from the right-hand-side of Figure 5.2, which
displays W˜profile
(
Θ˜′, Θ˜′′;xi
)
, the result of putting the proﬁle likelihood func-
tion in place of likelihood function in equation (3.5), against exp
(
θ̂i
)
, the
maximum likelihood estimate of the expression ratio. Although the strength of
evidence still changes sign at θ̂i = ± log
√
2, no trace remains of what resembles
a phase transition at those points in the precise hypothesis case.
The replacement of W˜profile (Θ
′,Θ′′;xi) with W˜profile
(
Θ˜′, Θ˜′′;xi
)
has high
impact on inference for a large portion of the genes (Figure 5.4). Levels of
evidence between 0 and 2 are most important for ﬁnding genes with evidence of
diﬀerential expression since negative levels correspond to evidence for equivalent
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expression, and levels above 2 normally indicate decisive evidence for diﬀerential
expression regardless of whether precise or imprecise hypotheses are speciﬁed.
5.2 Comparison to empirical Bayes
The theoretical null version of the empirical Bayes model of Efron (2007), when
applied to data structured as in Section 5.1, assumes the Student t statistic
T (Xi) has probability density f (•; 1) if gene i is diﬀerentially expressed, which
occurs with probability pi (1), and f (•; 0) if gene i is equivalently expressed,
which occurs with probability pi (0), where f (•; 0) is the Student t density with
n − 1 degrees of freedom. Thus, θi ∈ {0, 1} has probability distribution pi for
each i without implying that changes in θi could really be detected over repeated
experiments (2.4.3).
On the basis of the 10-day microarrays for the 7139 genes with complete data
(n = 6), the probability mass function pi was estimated by pˆi and the probability
density function f (•; 1) by fˆ (•; 1), with both estimators deﬁned by the method
of Efron (2007). Then
wˆ (1, 0;T (xi)) =
fˆ (T (xi) ; 1)
f (T (xi) ; 0)
is an approximate Bayes factor according to its role in approximating posterior
probabilities by estimated local false discovery rates. Herein, wˆ (1, 0;T (xi)) is
instead employed as an estimate of the weight of evidence for θi = 1 over θi = 0
as deﬁned by the special law of likelihood.
Figure 5.5 compares log10Wprofile
(
R1\ {0} , {0} ;xi
)
and log10Wprofile (Θ
′,Θ′′;xi)
of the ﬁxed-parameter model (5.1) to log10 wˆ (1, 0;T (xi)). The discrepancies
stem largely from diﬀerences in model assumptions. In the ﬁxed-parameter
model but not in the empirical Bayes model, the expression data are lognor-
mally distributed even in the case of diﬀerential expression. More importantly,
the empirical Bayes constrains the reciprocal of the coeﬃcient of variation of the
logarithmic expression ratios to either 0 or to a single value common to all dif-
ferentially expressed genes, whereas the ﬁxed-parameter model allows the coeﬃ-
cient of variation to vary from one diﬀerentially expressed gene to another. The
reversals of evidence between log10Wprofile (Θ
′,Θ′′;xi) and log10 wˆ (1, 0;T (xi))
(plotted as the gray circles) arise from a diﬀerence in hypotheses: the former
compares complex hypotheses about the mean, whereas the latter compares
simple hypotheses about the coeﬃcient of variation.
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Figure 5.1: Probabilities α̂
{0}
n (b) and α̂
[− log
√
2,log
√
2]
n (b) of observing misleading
evidence for the hypothesis that θi 6= 0 over the "simple" hypothesis that θi =
0 and for the hypothesis that |θi| > log
√
2 over the "composite" hypothesis
that |θi| ≤ log
√
2, respectively, for each of the evidence levels of Figures 1-5
(b ∈ {1/∞, 1/2, 1, 3/2, 2}) and at each of three stages of maturity (0, 3, and
10 days after the breaker stage of ripening). These proportions were computed
using equation (4.1), but with xi as the vector of the logarithms of the expression
ratios for the ith gene and with M as the number of genes that have suﬃcient
data for the computation of likelihood ratios.
6 Closing remarks
6.1 Highlights and discussion
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 axiomatically deﬁned the evidential function W in order
to uniquely weigh the evidence in observation x for a hypothesis θ ∈ Θ′ over
another hypothesis θ ∈ Θ′′. W applies not only to simple hypotheses, but also
to composite hypotheses, including complex hypotheses about ﬁxed parame-
ter values and intrinsically simple hypotheses about random parameter values.
Properly distinguishing between the nuisance parameter problem and the com-
posite hypothesis problem in Section 2.5 avoids pathologies of the proﬁle likeli-
hood without resorting to the representation of evidence by intervals of proﬁle
likelihoods. The proposed framework compares favorably with Bayesianism in
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Figure 5.2: The weight of evidence for diﬀerential expression over equivalent ex-
pression plotted against the maximum likelihood estimate of the expression ratio
for the tomato data at 10 days after the breaker stage of ripening. The vertical
gray lines are drawn at the boundary that separates the two precise hypotheses,
reﬂecting the idea that a gene is either diﬀerentially expressed or is equivalently
expressed, with no possibility of something in between. By contrast, the im-
precise hypotheses have no rigid boundary between diﬀerential expression and
equivalent expression. Darker circles represent genes that correspond to higher
values of
∣∣∣2Θ˜′ (θ̂i)− 1∣∣∣ and that thus seem to be more closely aligned with ei-
ther one imprecise hypothesis or the other, whereas lighter circles correspond
to more borderline genes. Θ˜′
(
θ̂i
)
estimates Θ˜′ (θi), the degree to which the ith
gene is diﬀerentially expressed.
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Figure 5.3: The degree of the truth of each imprecise hypothesis plotted against
eθ, the geometric mean of the expression ratio in the population. The black curve
represents Θ˜′, and the gray curve represents Θ˜′′. The vertical lines correspond
to the boundary between the precise hypotheses Θ′ and Θ′′. Degrees of truth
are calibrated by Deﬁnition 26.
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Figure 5.4: Eﬀects of replacing the precise hypotheses with the impre-
cise hypotheses for the data of Figure 5.2. The left-hand-side displays
Wprofile
(
Θ˜′, Θ˜′′;xi
)
plotted againstWprofile (Θ
′,Θ′′;xi), and the right-hand-side
hasWprofile (Θ
′,Θ′′;xi)−Wprofile
(
Θ˜′, Θ˜′′;xi
)
against Θ˜′
(
θ̂i
)
, the estimated ex-
tent of diﬀerential expression. The grayscale is the same as that of Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.5: The weight of evidence for diﬀerential gene expression under the
ﬁxed-parameter model versus the Bayes factor under the empirical Bayes model
for all genes with 6 ratios available. Each gray circle and each black circle
represents a diﬀerent gene. The diagonal is the line of equality.
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Example 10 because the former but not the latter satisﬁes the idealized principle
of inference to the best explanation (2.2.1). The evidential weight W (Θ′,Θ′′;x)
is consistent, coherent, and interpretable, as seen in Sections 2.3 and 4. These
properties warrant consideration of a new approach to simultaneous inference,
multiple comparisons, and sequential analysis (2.4).
Incomplete probability distributions represent imprecision in hypotheses to
mitigate the eﬀect of hypothesis boundaries on the weight of evidence, as il-
lustrated in the gene expression application (3, 5). Nonetheless, making hy-
potheses imprecise will sometimes insuﬃciently reduce the dependence of the
weight of evidence on arbitrarily selected parameter values. In such settings, the
use of two composite hypotheses separated by a non-arbitrary boundary entirely
eliminates such dependence. In the gene expression illustration of Section 5, the
weight of evidence for biologically signiﬁcant diﬀerential expression (|θi| > θ+)
versus biologically insigniﬁcant diﬀerential expression (|θi| ≤ θ+) would then
be replaced by the weight of evidence for overexpression/upregulation (θi > 0)
versus underexpression/downregulation (θi < 0), either superseding or comple-
menting an application of decision theory to the latter two hypotheses (Bickel,
2010).
6.2 Opportunities for further research
6.2.1 Additional models and applications
The laws of likelihood oﬀer an evidential framework that invites examination
of their practical eﬀects on statistical inference. The examination of normal
variates of Section 4 concentrated on the probability of observing misleading
evidence for a composite hypothesis over an interval hypothesis, ﬁnding that it
is often much less than that for a composite hypothesis over a simple hypothesis.
The microarray case study of Section 5 quantiﬁed the impact on evidential in-
ference of replacing simple hypotheses with interval hypotheses and of replacing
precise hypotheses with imprecise hypotheses.
The proposed framework may be further examined for other families of dis-
tributions and for other applications. In particular, the ﬁndings of Sections 2.3.3
and 3 suggest a fresh approach to bioequivalence studies in which researchers
seek to determine whether the evidence favors an interval hypothesis over a
composite hypothesis without requiring an artiﬁcially precise speciﬁcation of
the largest eﬀect size considered equivalent.
6.2.2 Robust evidential inference
There remains ample opportunity for research to make evidential inference about
composite hypotheses robust to unanticipated data distributions. Possible so-
lutions may utilize robust adjusted likelihood functions, contamination mixture
models, or nonparametric approaches, all of which require at least moderately
large samples. Each strategy will be discussed in turn.
A likelihood function adjustment designed to make the law of likelihood less
sensitive to model misspeciﬁcation (Royall and Tsou, 2003; Blume et al., 2007)
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might be used for robust inference under the general law of likelihood. The re-
sulting robust adjusted likelihood function performs well under certain violations
of the working model and yet retains full asymptotic eﬃciency if the working
model is correct (Royall and Tsou, 2003). Since the adjustment improves both
Neyman-Pearson and Bayesian uses of the likelihood function (Royall and Tsou,
2003), the adjustment is expected to improve evidential inference regarding com-
posite hypotheses as well.
A more classical approach to making the likelihood function robust against
potential outliers replaces the working model {f (•; θ) : θ ∈ Θ} with a mixture
model {(1− ε) f (•; θ) + εg (•; γ) : θ ∈ Θ}, where ε is the unknown probability
of contamination and g is the contamination density or mass function param-
eterized by γ (Aitkin and Wilson, 1980). It may be advisable to extend this
methodology to evidential inference about simple hypotheses before attempting
to generalize it to handle precise and imprecise composite hypotheses.
The empirical likelihood version of equation (2.9) is
W (S′, S′′) = sup
F ′∈S′
L (F ′;x) / sup
F ′′∈S′′
L (F ′′;x) ,
where L (•;x) is the nonparametric likelihood function (Owen, 2001) and where
S′ and S′′ are broad sets of distributions corresponding to diﬀerent hypotheses
distinguished by their constraints, e.g., S′ and S′′ may be large families of distri-
bution with means outside or inside some interval, respectively. Zhang (2009a)
studied the simple hypothesis caseW ({F ′} , {F ′′}) = L (F ′;x) /L (F ′′;x). Equa-
tion (3.5) may be analogously modiﬁed by replacing the parametric likelihood
function with the nonparametric likelihood function and constraint satisfaction
with partial constraint satisfaction indicated by the membership functions of
fuzzy sets.
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